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Abstract 
This study attempts to explain why the transition to a market economy is skill-biased.  It 
shows unequivocal evidence on increased skill wage premium and supply of skills in transition 
economies.  It examines whether similar skill–favoring shifts in the Russian and U.S. economies 
are driven by the same set of factors.  Our analysis elaborates on the model of alternative 
theories of the increased wage skill premium and then evaluates three main hypotheses: skill-
biased technological change, the market adjustment hypothesis, and the institutional factor 
hypothesis.  To test these hypotheses, the study uses unique linked employer-employee data 
that spans the 16 years of the Soviet and transition periods in Russia (1985-2000), with a special 
emphasis on data quality, measurement errors, and retrospective biases.  The main conclusion 
is that there is no uni-causal and time-invariant explanation for skill-biased changes in wages 
and employment in the Russian economy.  The increased skill wage premium has been driven 
mainly by institutional factors during the early period and by productivity and technological 
change during the late transition period, and reinforced by market adjustment of wage ratio to 
the true differences in labor productivity.   
 
Key words:  technological change, wage inequality, human capital, transition, Russia, linked 
employer-employee data 
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1. Introduction 
There is general agreement that there has been a long-term rise in the supply of and 
market rewards for skills throughout the world.  Overall as can be seen in Table 1 non-manual 
employment and university educated labor force have expanded rapidly and the relative wages 
of non-manual industrial workers have increased in most of the countries. 
Table 1:  Evidence on Skill Upgrading in Transition Economies. 
The first point to note is that each country has its own path.  The country-specific 
patterns of skill-biased changes in the wage structure do not always or necessarily overlap with 
the patterns of technological innovations and economic development.  We see large differences 
in the rates of returns to skills among countries with the same level of technology (e.g., Finland 
and Italy).  We also observe similar skill wage differences in the countries that stand far apart in 
terms of technological and institutional development (e.g., Russia and U.S.). 
The question as to which factors determine cross-country differences in the returns to 
skills still remains unanswered.  We have yet to learn to what extent the differences are driven 
by technology and to what extent they are due to country-specific wage determination 
processes and other institutional factors.  The best countries to look at for these issues are those 
that have gone through substantial structural and institutional changes.  In particular, transition 
countries that have moved to a market economy but have not yet achieved the level of 
technological advancement of the developed world would be useful “laboratories” to 
distinguish the contribution of various factors to the increased returns to skills. 
This study is built upon two stylized facts concerning the changes in the relative wages 
and employment of high-skilled workers during the period of transition to a market economy. 
First, there  has been an increase in the supply of skills in transition economies.  Our 
evidence here is unequivocal.  We find that the share of labor force with university education 
has increased in most of the transition countries.  For example, the Russian labor force survey 
reports a persistent year-to-year increase in the share of workers with tertiary education 
(technical colleges and universities) from 49% in 1992 to 55% in 2000 (Goskomstat, 2001a, p. 
145).  Similar changes can be found in other transition economies.  We also observe an increase 
in the share of non-manual employment.  Traditionally, employment in non-manual   3 
occupations was much lower in former socialist countries than in developed market economies, 
but it has rapidly grown during the transition period (Table 1A).  Over the last ten years this 
increase has produced a major shift in the overall occupational structure towards market-
oriented and more skill-demanding occupations (see Sabirianova, 2002). 
Second,  relative wages of high-skilled workers and returns to schooling increased sharply 
during the 1990s.1  This stylized fact was widely documented from the data on several transition 
countries (see Svejnar (1999), and Boeri and Terrell (2002) for a comprehensive review of 
relevant studies).  Figures 1 and 2 plot the existing estimates of the average returns to schooling 
and the returns to a year of university education for various transition countries from 1984 to 
2000.  Both figures illustrate a noticeable increase in the returns to schooling after market 
liberalization reforms in the early 1990s.  A similar rise in the returns to skills can be seen in the 
data on the wage premium of more skilled non-manual workers in industry and manufacturing 
(see Table 1C).  The magnitude of these changes in transition economies exceeds by far their 
magnitude in advanced market economies over the last decade.  Another credible piece of 
evidence comes from Freeman and Oostendorp’s study.  Using the ILO survey on wages in 161 
occupations in over 150 countries, they documented a sharp increase in skill differentials in 
countries moving from communism to free markets (see Freeman and Oostendorp, 2000). 
Figure 1:  Returns to a Year of Schooling in Transition Economies, 1984-2000. 
Figure 2:  Returns to a Year of University Education in Transition Economies, 1984-2000. 
Overall, findings from various data sources are highly consistent in showing skill-biased 
changes in both employment composition and wage structure in transition countries. 
There has been, however, less discussion of and even less agreement concerning the 
causes of these stylized facts.  Several possible explanations have been proposed, including 
adjustment of relative wages to marginal products, increase in relative productivity of skilled 
workers, excessive d emand for manual workers during the socialist period, technological 
change, price liberalization, and openness to trade (see e.g. Kertesi and Kollo (1999), Keane and 
Prasad (2002), and Vodopivec (2002) for discussion of a few of these hypotheses).  Most of these   4 
explanations have yet to be modeled  explicitly  and tested  thoroughly  against the data.2  
Evidently more theoretical and empirical work is needed to evaluate the alternative theories of 
skill-biased transition. 
This study elaborates on the model of a lternative theories of the increased wage skill 
premium and then explicitly tests various theories based on Russian firm and individual-level 
data.  The study uses unique linked employer-employee data that spans the 16 years of the 
Soviet and transition periods (1985-2000). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 documents skill upgrading 
within Russian industry during the 1990s and examines whether similar skill–favoring shifts in 
the Russian and U.S. economies are driven by the same set of factors.  Section 3 presents a 
conceptual framework for understanding skill-biased changes documented in Section 2 and 
formulates the testable hypotheses.  Section 4 develops an econometric model from which the 
testable implications of the alternative explanations are obtained.  Data and summary statistics 
are described in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.  Section 7 reports the results of the tests.  Section 
8 provides a brief discussion of additional factors which bear further exploration, and Section 9 
summarizes the main conclusions of this study. 
2. Skill Upgrading within Russian Industry and U.S. Manufacturing 
I begin by documenting basic facts on skill upgrading in Russian industry3 based on the 
enterprise reports submitted to Goskomstat (the federal statistical agency).  Similar to the labor 
force survey, wage reports from industrial enterprises  provide consistent evidence of an 
increased skill wage premium of industrial workers. 
This study  follows Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) in treating non-manual/non-
production workers as  high-skilled and manual/production workers as  low-skilled.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 The market returns to unobservable skills have also increased during the transition period.  Convincing 
evidence of a rise in within-skill group inequality has been presented by Brainerd (1998) for Russia and 
by Keane and Prasad (2002) for Poland. 
2 Kertesi and Kollo (1999) provide evidence that the change in relative productivity cannot explain the 
general rise in the returns to schooling. 
3 According to the Russian classification of the branches of the national economy, “industry” includes 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and selected industrial services such as car repair.   5 
manual/non-manual worker distinction in Russian statistics is directly derived from the Russian 
Classification of Occupations and Activities.4  It is also closely associated with educational 
categories.  On average 72 percent of non-manual workers in industry had at least a secondary 
specialized or higher education (13+), while 78 percent of manual workers had a 
vocational/secondary education or less (12–) (RLMS, 1994-2000).  Hence the wage ratio of non-
manual to manual workers can be considered as a rough approximation of the skill wage 
premium. 
  Russian industrial statistics reveal a remarkably sharp increase in the wage ratio of non-
manual to manual workers during the late Soviet and transition periods.  Figure 3 shows that 
(reported) relative wages of non-manual workers rose by an average of 21 percent per year 
starting from very compressed differences (7.5%) in 1987 and almost converging to the current 
U.S. wage ratio (74.2% in Russia vs. 77.7% in the U.S.) in 2000.5  The actual increase in skill wage 
premium would be even bigger if on top of officially accrued earnings one were to add the 
underreported wages disproportionately paid to managerial and professional workers, a fact 
well documented in the literature6.  Interestingly, despite increasing relative costs of non-
manual workers, industrial enterprises have managed to increase the share of their white-collar 
personnel from 17.8% in 1980 to 21.5% in 2000, as can be seen from Figure 4.  This fact, together 
with evidence from the population and employment statistics on the increased number of 
                                                                 
4 Goskomstat defines manual and non-manual workers according to the Russian Classification of 
Occupations and Activities (1986 and 1993).  Manual workers (“rabochiye”) are workers engaged in 
producing, storing, transporting goods, and providing so called “material services” such as repairing, 
janitorial and guard services, etc.  Non-manual workers (“sluzhashchiye”) include those engaged in 
supervision (all managers including heads of structural units and their immediate associates), engineers, 
economists, other professionals and associate professionals, their assistants, and clerical workers [see 
Goskomstat Instructions on Employment and Wage Statistics, 1987, 1993, and 1999]. 
5 Observed spikes on the graph can be associated with several wage liberalization reforms.  The 1986 
wage reform (resumed in 1987) increased base wages by 20 percent for blue-collar workers and 30 
percent for specialists.  In the same year (1987) the Law on State Enterprises advocated the principle of 
“full self-financing” and gave managers power to allocate additionally earned funds among wages.  Most 
wage controls were removed in 1992 as part of a major reform policy of market liberalization and mass 
privatization.  Finally, the last regulatory rule concerning taxes on excessive wages was abolished as of 
January 1, 1996. 
6 “Payment ‘under the table’ is far more likely to occur in the case of senior managers and specialists or 
highly skilled manual workers, so that published data will be likely to underestimate the scale of pay 
differentials” (Clarke, 1999, p. 286).   6 
graduates and the increased share of educated labor force, suggests that rapidly growing skill 
wage premium is unlikely to be supply driven.7 
Figure 3: Percentage Wage Differences between Non-manual and Manual Workers in Russian Industry 
and U.S. Manufacturing, 1980-2000. 
Figure 4: Non-manual Workers Share in Total Employment in Russian Industry and U.S. 
Manufacturing, 1980-2000. 
  Thus Russia, with its skill-favoring shifts in wages and employment, fits very well 
within the worldwide picture of changes in skill structure, drawn by Machin and Reenen (1998), 
and Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998).  As in the Unites States and other advanced market 
economies, most of this shift in Russia has occurred within rather than between industries.8  Yet 
it is puzzling why the trends in Russia and the United States are so similar.  An even more 
important question to consider is whether the skill-favoring shifts in both countries are driven 
by the same factors. 
  A series of studies pointed to skill-biased technological change (SBTC) as a major 
explanation for the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. labor market.  “The recent consensus is 
that technical change favors more skilled workers…and exacerbates inequality” (Acemoglu, 
2002, p.7).  Although alternative explanations such as the fall in the real value of the minimum 
wage, declining unionization, organizational change, and international trade have also been 
explored (e.g., Lee, 1999; Card and DiNardo, 2002), SBTC is widely viewed as the most 
significant contributor to the rise in skill wage premium. 
This virtually uni-causal explanation would likely fail in the case of Russia.  If 
technological innovations were the main reason for increased skill wage inequality, then Figure 
                                                                 
7 Supply factors might have influenced skill wage premium in the 1992-1993 period during which a 
significant part of non-manual workers moved from manufacturing to the service sector. 
8 I have decomposed the increase in the employment share of non-manual workers into between-industry 
and within-industry components using fairly standard methodology described in Berman, Bound, and 
Griliches (1994).  13 industrial categories were considered.  Decomposition revealed that while in the 
1980s 86% of the total skill upgrading was happening within industries (80.3% in 1980-1985 and 91.6% in 
1985-1990), in the 1990s the entire increase in the share of non-manual workers was due to within-
industry changes (104%).  Moreover, “pure between-industry shifts” would even reduce the share of non-
manual workers in the 1990s (e.g. due to the disproportionate labor outflow from skill-intensive machine 
building and military production).   7 
3 would suggest that the pace of technological change in the 1990s was much higher in Russia 
than in most advanced market economies.  As Section 6 will show, existing evidence does not 
support this conclusion.9  Then the question becomes  why relative wages of high-skilled Russian 
workers have grown so fast?  I argue that there are at least three sets of possible factors that could 
produce a phenomenal rise in skill wage  premium.  The first, which I call the productivity 
hypothesis, suggests that the relative productivity of skilled workers has increased over the last 
ten years of transition due to domestically-generated within-industry SBTC, technology-
enhancing foreign direct investment, between-industry product demand shifts, entry of new 
firms with the latest technology and management practices, and skill-favoring organizational 
change.  The second possible set of factors comes from the market adjustment hypothesis, which 
implies that market liberalization decompresses earnings restrictions imposed by the old 
socialist wage-setting mechanism and adjusts wage ratio to the true differences in marginal 
productivity.  Finally, the third set I characterize as the institutional factor hypothesis.  According 
to this hypothesis, there are non-market institutional forces that produce skill-biased changes in 
the wage structure (labor market institutions and policies, ownership, and legal environment).  
The purpose of this study is  to evaluate different hypotheses and provide  a  general 
methodology for understanding increased wage premium of skilled workers during the 
transition to a market economy. 
Figure 5:  Possession of Personal Computers per 100 Households. 
Figure 6:  Internet Usership per 1,000 Population. 
3. A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Increased Wage Premium of Skilled Workers 
during the Transition to a Market Economy 
The following graphical representation (Figure 7) borrowed from Bound and Johnson 
(1992) is useful in demonstrating how the same increase in relative wages of skilled workers can 
be achieved through demand-supply interactions, as well as through market adjustment and 
institutional forces.  Data from Russia and the United States suggest that the share of skilled 
                                                                 
9 Some facts on the cross-country differences in the basic technology measures such as possession of 
personal computers, Internet use and mobile phones are documented in Figures 5 and 6.   8 
employment and relative wages have increased in both countries during the last decade.  
Graphically, both economies moved from point A to point B achieving higher relative wages 
(Wh/Wl) and higher relative employment (Nh/Nl) of skilled workers. 
Figure 7: Skill Wage Premium Decomposition: Supply, Demand, and Institutional Factors. 
From a pure demand-supply story perspective for relative wages to go up an increased 
supply of skilled workers must be compensated by upward demand shifts favoring skilled 
workers.  Hence, the natural candidates for explaining a simultaneous increase in relative 
wages and skilled employment lie on the demand side  including  skill-biased technological 
change and product demand shifts towards sectors with higher demand for skills.  This 
explanatory approach assumes that an economy is functioning on the labor demand curve and 
wages are set to be equal to the worker’s marginal product. 
Because the Soviet economy did not function according to competitive market principles 
it seems unlikely that the wages reflected worker’s marginal productivity.  Although we lack 
the direct measures of workers’ marginal productivity during the pre-transition period, indirect 
evidence suggests that the connection between earnings and labor efforts was weak.  Several 
Soviet studies admitted that highly educated workers were underpaid.  The wage growth of 
unskilled workers had been larger than for the skilled workers for 1968-87.  Thus “…the direct 
link between earnings and qualifications, still noticeable in 1968, had been completely destroyed 
by 1978, and by 1989 only some positive movements in this field could be observed” 
(Rimashevskaya and Patsiorkovski, 1992, p.69). 
Put another way, the movement of economy from point A to point B might simply 
reflect market corrections of distortions imposed by the old wage-equalizing policy.  Without 
any shifts in the demand for skilled labor we can observe the same results by means of market 
forces that adjust wages towards the true value of marginal product. 
So was the market adjustment responsible for the skill-biased changes in the structure of 
wages in Russia?  While the market adjustment hypothesis is a very attractive explanation, the 
timing of wage liberalization reforms does not seem to be consistent with the general trend in 
the rise of wage inequality.  While the first two sharp increases in relative wages of skilled 
workers  coincide with two major wage liberalization reforms in 1987-88 and 1991-92, it is   9 
puzzling why the wage ratio continues to rise at a very high rate after 1992 when most of the 
wage controls were removed.  I conclude from this that wage liberalization reforms cannot be 
the only cause of the skill-biased changes in wages. 
Finally, institutional changes can also bring an economy from point A to point B.  The 
most frequently mentioned examples in the U.S. economy are reduced value of minimum 
wages and de-unionization.  In the case of Russia, it is also possible that the weakening of the 
unions might have contributed to an increase in  overall wage inequality10.  Among other 
potential factors of skill-biased changes in the wage structure are inadequate legal protection of 
low-paid workers, increased power of enterprise administration to extract earnings rents, and 
other structural and organizational changes which are not reflected in the increased skilled 
workers productivity. 
Before further exploration of the proposed hypotheses,  I will  introduce a simple 
methodological framework that links wage ratio to supply of skills, to demand generated by 
increased productivity of skilled workers and technological change, to market adjustment, and 
to institutional change. 
In modeling SBTC and wage inequality it is traditional to begin with the CES production 
function (see e.g. Bound and Johnson, 1992).  It is generally assumed that total output in firm j 
(Qj) depends on employment of high-skilled and low-skilled workers (Nhj and N lj): 
( ) ( ) [ ] s s s s s s / ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( - - - + = lj lj hj hj j j N g N g A Q ,  (1) 
where ghj and glj are firm-specific parameters of productive efficiency of high-skilled and low-
skilled workers, Aj is technological efficiency of firm j, and s is the elasticity of substitution 
between labor inputs (s‡1 if high-skilled and low-skilled workers are gross substitutes). 
  The high-skilled/low-skilled ratio of marginal products for a firm j is given by 
s / 1 -
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
=
lj
hj
lj
hj
lj
hj
N
N
g
g
m
m
,  (2) 
where mhj and mlj represent the marginal products of high-skilled and low-skilled workers.   10 
  According to Eq. 2, the wage ratio of high skilled to low skilled workers under 
competitive labor markets is completely determined by the differences in productivity and the 
relative supply of the two skill groups.  As Card and DiNardo (2002) noted, “other features of 
the labor market that potentially affect relative wages such as rents, efficiency wage premiums 
or institutional wage floors are ignored” (p.4). 
To take into account the possibilities of market disequilibrium, policy interventions, and 
institutional setting in the process of wage determination, suppose that actual wages deviate 
from the competitive level due to environment-specific (y) and firm-specific (mj) components, as 
shown in Eq. 3.  The component  y can be treated as the index of wage compression or 
equalizing wage grid introduced by the government.  It also can reflect institutional wage 
floors, labor market policies, legal regulations, and other environment characteristics that are 
common for all firms in the same market.  The firm-specific productivity-unrelated component 
of wage differences (mj) can capture various rents caused by employee ownership, within firm 
distribution of power, the strength of unions, intra-firm organizational changes, and other firm-
specific institutional characteristics. 
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where y<1. 
  Taking logs of Eq. 3 and first differencing produces the function of the evolution of 
relative wages:  
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An important point to note here is that, based on Eq. 4, the well-documented fact of the 
increase in the returns to unobservable skills based on the earnings residual analysis can not be 
interpreted as favoring the technological change hypothesis.  In principle, all factors might 
contribute to the increased residual component.  The challenging task is how to disentangle the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 Minimum wages in Russia were not significant over the period of transition to a market economy.  
According t o Goskomstat (2001b), the percentage ratio of minimum wages to average wages was 
fluctuating between 3.76 to 8.79 percent in 1993-2000.   11 
effects of competing explanations.  Below I present an econometric methodology to test these 
explanations. 
4. Econometric Methodology 
  This section offers two econometric approaches for two distinct types of data: the firm-
level data and the linked employer-employee data.  The first approach uses a production 
function framework and estimates the equations for relative wages.  The second approach takes 
a standard wage function and augments it with firm-level productivity and other firm 
characteristics. 
By transforming Eq. 3, the first approach leads to the simple econometric model of 
relative wages 
jt jt jt jt t jt N g w e d m y + - + + = ln ) / 1 ( ln ln ln ln ,  (5) 
where wjt represents the wage ratio of high skilled to low skilled workers of firm j in period t, yt 
and mjt represent productivity-unrelated environment-specific and firm-specific factors of wage 
differences, gjt stands for relative differences in productivity between two skill groups, the Njt 
denotes the relative supply of the two skill groups, and ejt is an error term with E(e)=0. 
Being firm-invariant, the environment-specific factors can be captured through the set of 
year dummies (lnyt=tTt). 
The firm-specific productivity-unrelated component of wage differences between two 
skill groups is allowed to vary over firms and over observable time varying firm characteristics 
(Eq. 6) 
jt jt jt j jt u t Z Z + + + = 2 1 ln g g a m ,   (6) 
where aj is a firm unobserved component, Zjt is a vector of observable productivity-unrelated 
factors influencing skill wage premium, such as legal and organizational form of enterprise, the 
strength of unions, and contract enforcement, and ujt is an error term with E(u)=0.  Observable 
characteristics (Zjt) are interacted with the time trend, which allows for time varying response of 
intra-firm wage differences to changes in observable characteristics.  Because the equation is in   12 
log terms, lnmjt measures the percentage by which the actual wage ratio of firm j deviates from 
its competitive level in a given institutional environment. 
  The estimation of Eq. 5 is complicated by the fact that the productivity component of 
wage differences is not directly observable.  Instead, we can use proxy variables for gjt such as 
the level of technological development observable through labor productivity, capital/output 
ratio,  new products, contribution of high-tech industries,  and technology transfer through 
foreign direct investment.  It is convenient to present lngjt as a linear function of proxy variables 
Gjt and an error term: lngjt=qGjt+rjt, assuming that E(r)=0 and Cov(G,r)=0.  It is also reasonable to 
assume that r is not correlated with other explanatory variables, which makes the OLS estimates 
consistent. 
  Under the assumptions made, Eq. 5 can be rewritten as 
( ) jt jt jt jt jt jt jt j t jt r u N G t Z Z T w + + + - + + + + = e d q g g a t ln ) / 1 ( ln 2 1   (8) 
For the purposes of this study, the productivity measures (Gjt) are interacted with the 
time trend in order to test if relative wages are becoming more responsive to the changes in 
relative productivity over the period of transition to a market economy. 
Thus, the base model of the relative wages is specified as follows 
jt jt jt jt jt jt j t jt N t G G t Z Z T w u d b b g g a t + + + + + + + = ln ln 1 2 1 2 1 ,  (9) 
where the composite error term ujt is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and d1=-1/d. 
Eq. 9 can be consistently estimated by either the fixed effects or random effects methods.  
Assumptions on the correlation between unobserved firm heterogeneity and observable time 
varying variables can be formally tested by using a Hausman test.  The estimation results will 
indicate whether the gap between relative wages and relative productivity is diminishing over 
the period of transition to a market economy.  We can also see to what extent changes in wages 
of high-skilled workers are responsive to technological measures, institutional factors (rents), 
and relative supply shifts. 
Our key hypotheses can also be tested by estimating the augmented wage functions in 
the panel data, in which individual observations are linked to corresponding firm   13 
characteristics.11  Estimating wage equations in the linked employer-employee data has certain 
advantages over firm-level estimation.  Individual data often give better measures of skills and 
rent-generating  attributes by providing information on occupation, education, experience, 
computer skills, employee ownership, and other useful measures.  In the linked employer-
employee data, individual characteristics are complemented with firm-level information on 
firm performance, ownership, technology, and other firm characteristics. 
  To take into account the market inefficiencies and institutional factors, it is assumed that 
the actual wages (Wijt) deviate from their competitive level (W*ijt) due to environment-specific 
and firm-specific factors.  Individual rents could also contribute to the existing gap. 
This leads to the following econometric model of wages: 
ijt jt jt ijt ijt t i j i t ijt eG dZ cR bX T W e x a t + + + + + + + = ) , ( ln ,  (10) 
where Wijt represents wages of worker i employed by firm j in period t, ai is  time-constant 
individual heterogeneity,  ) , ( t i j x is the pure firm effect for the firm j at which worker i is 
employed at period t,  Xijt is a vector of observable productivity skills of workers, Rijt is a vector 
of attributes that potentially could generate rents such as employee ownership and managerial 
status, and Zjt and Gjt are vectors of institutional and technological (productivity-related) firm-
specific factors mentioned above.   
  Observable firm characteristics will be interacted with the time trend and a skill measure 
(Sijt) to see changes in their effect on worker wages and returns to skills over the transition 
period. 
ijt ijt jt ijt jt jt jt ijt ijt t i j i t ijt t S Y S Y t Y Y cR bX T W e l l l l x a t + + + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 ) , ( ln ,   
where  ( ) jt jt jt G Z Y , =   (11) 
The parameters of augmented wage equation can be consistently estimated by the fixed 
effects method.  The random effects method is likely to produce inconsistent estimation given a 
foreseen correlation between the individual and firm heterogeneity and the independent 
variables, e.g. schooling and productivity.   
                                                                 
11 Unfortunately such data rarely exist.  It was not until recently that economists began exploring the 
greatest potential in developing the linked employer-employee data.  See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for   14 
Linked employer-employee data provide a powerful tool to measure the extent to which 
changes in wages are attributed to individual human capital, individual rents,  labor 
productivity, technological change, and institutional factors.  In our case, the value of such data 
is even higher since this is the only source of wages of Russian workers in the pre-transition 
period (1985 and 1990). 
5.  Data 
The previous section has shown that empirical analysis of the factors behind changes in 
the wage structure requires detailed information from both firms and workers.  This study 
relies on two main sources of data:  administrative enterprise reports and  a survey of 
individuals. 
The first data source is the Annual Registries of Russian Industrial Enterprises (RPP, 
Registr Promyshlennykh Predpriyatii).  The RPP data contain information from the reports of 
enterprises submitted to the Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) for the period 1985-2000.  
This study uses the following RPP variables: the value of production net of tax, the value of 
fixed assets, profit/losses, the wage bill (net of taxes) for manual and non-manual workers, the 
average number of full-time equivalent manual and non-manual workers, foreign direct 
investment, 10-digit product code, 5-digit industry code, location, legal and organizational form 
of enterprise, and ownership (classified into state, private, and mixed categories).12  No 
information on wages is available prior to 1992, which restricts the firm-level analysis of wage 
ratio to the period 1992-2000.   Unfortunately,  original data (especially for the early period) 
required intensive and careful cleaning, checking for consistency in variables, eliminating 
entering errors, and finding firms that changed their identification number due to re-
organization.13  During the process of cleaning,  prisons, institutions for special medical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
a comprehensive review of these data sources. 
12 Wage data from the enterprise reports are available for 1992-2000, product data for 1993-2000, and 
information on foreign direct investment for 1994-2000 only. 
13 I thank Dmitry Krutikov and Viktor Orekhov for their assistance with data preparation.  The following 
consistency rules were implemented:  1) total employment is no less then the number of manual workers, 
2) total wage bill must be higher than the wage bill of manual workers, 3) the value of production and the 
value of fixed assets are non-negative, and 4) maximum values of employment, wages, output, and   15 
treatment,  internal enterprise balances, reports by ministries in 1992-1993, firms with missing 
information on  all continuous variables, and double  counting due to reports  from both 
production association and their master enterprise were removed.  As the last two rows of Table 
3 indicate, about 2.8 percent of enterprises from the original sample were eliminated, which 
reduced the final sample to 22,135-27,461 firms in a given year.  Total employment in the final 
firm sample covers between 69 percent (1998-2000) to 87 percent (1993) of the total number of 
workers in Russian industry reported by Goskomstat (2001b).  It is important to note, however, 
that our firm sample represents mainly the sector of large and medium-sized enterprises.  Small 
firms with less than 100 employees account for 36.5 percent of the number of enterprises and 3.6 
percent of total employment in the final sample.  
Our  second  data source is the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a 
household survey based on careful probability sampling.14  These data have been augmented in 
several ways:  adding a number of questions, including better measures of the current wage and 
retrospective information on jobs held in 1985 and 1990; coding employer and job 
characteristics, including industry and occupation; and linking industrial and agricultural 
employees to the firm-level data.15  
Although data are rich in variables (thousands of questions are asked), only a  few 
variables can be constructed for pre-transition years (1985 and 1990).  These include wages, 
industry, occupation, education, and experience.  Another crucial data limitation is that it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
capital must be reasonable (obvious entering errors were corrected or eliminated).  In addition, various 
coding systems have been c hecked for consistency, including: 1) changes in the methodology of 
classification of regions, industry, products, and ownership over time, 2) changes in measurement units, 
3) entering errors in regional and industrial codes, 4) transitory changes in regions, industry, and 
ownership, and 5) duplicate observations in the registration number.  Changes in the enterprise’ IDs 
(OKPO) due to re-organization were found by the computer program that compared the previous-year 
reports and the current reports of the previous-year values.  ID changes were also traced manually by 
comparing name and address of the enterprises.  3,295 enterprises in the final sample were found to have 
changed their registration numbers due to re-organization. 
14 See Swafford et al (1997) for a detailed description of RLMS sampling and interviewing procedures.  
The RLMS data consists of two longitudinal surveys:  1992-1993 (wave 1) and 1994-1996, 1998, and 2000 
(wave 2).  This study is restricted to wave 2, because no information on firm characteristics is available 
from wave 1.  In 2000, respondents were also asked retrospective questions on jobs held in 1985 and 1990 
(see Appendix 4 for discussion on the nature of retrospective questions and associated “recall bias”).   
15 The coding and linking are described in Earle and Sabirianova (2002).   16 
contains little information on firm-specific characteristics.  No information on performance or 
technology is available.  Because the firm-level information is important for this study, the 
individual sample is restricted only to those industrial employees that are linked to the firm-
level data, thus reducing the total number of observations in the data set.  Table 2 summarizes 
the process of creating the final sample which consists of between 423 and 547 firms and 
between 1,124 and 1,537 employees in a given year. 
Table 2 shows that in addition to the Annual Registries of Industrial Enterprises (RPP), 
the firm-level  variables in the linked employer-employee data  are taken from the Annual 
Registries of Agricultural Enterprises (RSP, Registr Sel’skokhozyaistvennykh Predpriyatii, 1995-
2000).  Although the RSP data  are not usable in  the firm-level estimation (Eq.9) because of 
missing data on manual and non-manual workers, it could  nevertheless be  utilized in 
estimating the wage equation in the linked employer-employee data.  It contains the same set of 
variables as the RPP data, e.g., the value of production net of tax, the value of fixed assets, 
profit/losses, the average number of full-time equivalent workers, etc.  In the linked employer-
employee data, only those RPP and RSP firms are selected that match the survey of individuals.  
6.  Descriptive Statistics 
The pattern of rise in both wage and employment ratios of non-manual to manual 
workers in the RPP data is remarkably similar to the one that is observed at the level of the 
whole  Russian industry (see Table 3).  The average wage ratio of non-manual to manual 
workers has been steadily increasing over the last decade from 1.62 in 1992 to 2.06 in 2000.  The 
average employment ratio also appears to have been rising from 0.25 in 1992 to 0.53 in 2000. 
Table 3:   Wage Ratio and Employment Ratio of Non-Manual to Manual Workers in the Firm Sample, 
1992-2000. 
However, the rise in wage and employment ratios has not been universal across 
different firms.  During the period 1992-2000, 38.1 percent of firms experienced decline in wage 
ratio and 26.1 percent of firms reduced their share of non-manual workers.  An interesting 
research question that will be explored later in this paper is why some firms but not others   17 
increase the pay for skilled labor, which thus drives up the average skill wage premium in the 
whole economy. 
As the previous discussion has shown, technological change is often considered as a 
primary cause for the increased skill wage premium.  While the dynamics are clearly positive in 
Western countries, on the contrary, in Russia the picture of recent technological development is 
quite ambiguous. 
Table 4 presents trends in available technological measures from the Goskomstat of 
Russia.  Some measures definitely show positive technological changes, e.g. growing number of 
patents, increasing  R&D expenditures in the business sector, and increasing number of 
telephone lines and users of mobile phones.  It is also not surprising that, along with the rest of 
the world, Russia is gradually computerizing.  Despite a sharp decline in  domestic  PC 
production, possession of personal computers per 100 households rose from 1.7 in 1992 to 6.8 in 
2000, and the total number of internet users also increased from one thousand to 3.932 million 
for the same period.  The 2000 RLMS survey reports even higher proportions of workers used 
computers at work: 25.6 percent among all workers and 20.6 percent among industrial 
employees.  However, as documented in Figures  5 and  6, the speed of computer-based 
technological development was much slower in Russia than in the European Union and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 4:   Measures of Technological Change in Russia. 
Other trends in Table 4 are less consistent with the skill-biased technological change 
argument as applied to Russia.  Goskomstat figures indicate that industrial equipment is 
becoming older and enterprises are investing less in new technology.  Goskomstat also reports 
significant cuts in the federal budget for science, a decreased number of industrial enterprises 
with R&D departments, and a reduced total number of R&D workers (cut almost in half in 
1992-2000).   
Unfortunately, none of these common technology measures are available in our firm-
level data.  Instead, I offer five alternative measures that could serve as good proxies for the 
level of technological development: capital/output ratio, foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
Russian industry, investment abroad by Russian enterprises, high-technology industries, and   18 
production of new products.  The capital/output ratio is included to test the hypothesis of skill-
capital complementarity.  FDI to Russia is likely to generate the transfer of advanced technology 
and more efficient management practices, given that most of foreign investment comes from 
developed OECD countries.  Investment abroad could also indicate availability of advanced 
technology that allows some Russian enterprises to invest abroad.  High-technology industries 
are defined on the basis of OECD classification for developed countries as the science-based 
industries whose products involve above-average levels of R&D such as aerospace, computers 
and office machinery, communications equipment, and pharmaceuticals  (OECD, 1993).  
Corresponding industries found in the Russian classification of industries are listed in 
Appendix 1.  Finally, the last but not least important measure of technological development is a 
dummy indicating that an enterprise produces new products.  New products are defined as 
goods produced by Russian industrial firms in 1993-2000 but not produced in 1977 according to 
the 1977 Soviet Classification of Products (see Appendix 2).16  Our premise here is that new 
products are likely to embody new technologies and methods of production and could serve as 
an indicator for technological change.  
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of all of these measures in 1995 and 2000, and for the 
sample of firms with declining and growing wage ratio.  As we have already seen in Table 4, 
data in Table 5 also depict contradictory trends in technological development.  Simultaneously, 
we observe an increase in the proportion of enterprises with FDI and a decline in the share of 
firms operating in high-technology industries and producing new products.  What remains 
unambiguous though, is that firms with a growing wage ratio on average have higher levels of 
new technologies:  bigger capital/output ratio, larger involvement with foreign investment, and 
higher probability of producing new and technology embodied products. 
Table 5:   Characteristics of the Firm Sample, 2000. 
Among other variables included in the estimated wage ratio function are average labor 
productivity (output/employment) to control for productivity changes and a dummy indicating 
negative profit.  In the transition context, t he latter  variable  often  serves not  only  as  a 
                                                                 
16 No product information is available for 1992.  Firms engaged in manufacturing of new products in 1993 
are assumed to produce them in 1992.   19 
performance measure but also as an indicator of soft budget constraints and accessibility to 
subsidies and soft money (see Lizal and Svejnar, 2002).  Otherwise, it would be hard to explain 
why negative profits are so persistent over time.  For instance, in the balanced 5-year panel of 
enterprises with non-missing profit values (1996-2000), almost 50 percent of enterprises 
reported negative profit for 2 years and more, and 27.8 percent had negative profit for 4-5 years 
in a row.  Only under soft budget constraints such firms are able to survive in the market 
economy.   
I also look at the variation of skill wage premium across different forms of ownership 
and industries.  A category for state ownership includes enterprises that are owned 100 percent 
by federal, regional, and municipal governments.  Domestically-owned private enterprises, 
NGOs, and foreign companies are combined in a category of “private ownership”.  Finally, a 
category for mixed ownership represents any combination of domestic forms of ownership.  
Table 5 shows considerable changes in the ownership structure over the five-year period, with a 
clear pattern of a rise in private ownership.   
Overall, summary statistics indicate that the firms with a growing wage ratio on average 
tend to have positive profits and higher levels of technological development and labor 
productivity.  These firms are less likely to be state owned and more likely to operate in 
metallurgy and machine building. 
  We bring all of these firm characteristics to the wage function estimation in the linked 
employer-employee data described in Section 4 (Eq. 11).17  The main disadvantage of these data 
is the small sample size which is compensated by the richness of variables, the longer time-
series spanned from the socialist period, and the separability of individual and firm effects.  
Table 6 presents summary statistics of our rich set of variables for the sub-samples of manual 
and non-manual workers.  Non-manual workers are more likely to be employed in machine-
building,  high-technology industries,  manufacturing of new goods, the  state sector, and 
enterprises with higher labor productivity and non-negative profit.  No significant differences 
                                                                 
17 Because product information is not available for 1985 and 1990, the variable “Produced new products in 
a given year” was substituted by the variable “Ever produced new products during 1993-2000”.   20 
between manual and non-manual workers are found with respect to capital/output ratio and 
foreign investment. 
Table 6:  Characteristics of the Individual Sample (Russian Industry, Linked Employer-Employee Data, 
2000). 
Table 6 also exploits a set of variables that could proxy for potential earnings rents 
gained through the strength of workers’ organizations or due to the power of managerial 
control.  On the worker’s side, I use the number of strikes by region and year.  On the manager’s 
side, one option is to consider different legal and organizational forms of the enterprises.  Based 
on the full legal name, all enterprises were classified into four categories:  state unitary 
enterprises, partnerships (including limited liabilities) and cooperatives, open joint-stock 
companies, and closed joint stock companies.  Earnings rents should be less difficult to extract 
when there are no market pressures and no controls by outside shareholders.  For example, 
many enterprises in Russia initially were organized in the form of closed joint-stock companies 
with no shares circulating in the stock exchange.  Typically, insiders (enterprise administration) 
have full control over such a company.  Higher wage ratio in closed joint-stock companies 
would likely support the rent explanation of increased skill wage premium.  
Another rent-related variable to exploit is the extent of labor contract violations in the 
form of unpaid or late wages.18  Russian transition brought this unusual phenomenon to the 
remarkably mass level, with 60 percent of workers reporting wage arrears in 1998 (RLMS, 1998).  
Wage arrears  were widespread in many industries, in different forms of ownership, in both 
profitable and loss-making firms.  At the same time, many studies pointed out the high regional 
variation  in wage arrears—from almost no wage arrear regions to  regions with nearly 100 
percent workers receiving late or no payments.  I utilize this regional variation in wage arrears 
to  distinguish between legal environments of different regions.  My argument here is that 
extraction of earnings rents would be easier in the environment in which legal enforcement is 
weak and contract violations are taking place.  Regional wage arrears are calculated for each 
RLMS district (county) as the average number of overdue monthly wages. 
                                                                 
18  The phenomenon of w age arrears  during Russian transition has been explored by Desai and Idson 
(2000), Earle and Sabirianova (2002), and Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999), among others.   21 
Finally, Table 6 gives the mean individual characteristics of manual and non-manual 
workers.  The dependent variable is log of real average monthly wages at the primary job.  
Questions on average monthly wages were directly asked in the 1998 and 2000 surveys.  The 
2000 survey also contains retrospective questions on average monthly wages for 1985 and 1990.  
Measurement and recall errors associated with retrospective questions  are discussed  in 
Appendix 4.  In 1994-1996, average wages were imputed in the following way:  for employees 
without wage arrears, I use the actual earnings received last month from the primary job; for 
employees with wage arrears, actual earnings received last month  are not an appropriate 
measure because of irregular and late payments; instead, I use the total wage debt owed to the 
worker divided by the number of monthly wages owed.19  Wages have also been deflated by 
regional CPI to control for inflation and to equate regional differences in cost of living.  As to 
other RLMS variables, I use all available time varying characteristics such as years of schooling, 
potential labor market experience measured as age minus years of schooling minus 6 pre-school 
years, occupation, industry, and employee ownership.  The latter variable is interesting since it 
can show potential rents coming from employee ownership.  We see that non-manual workers 
on average have higher wages, higher years of schooling, lower years of labor market 
experience, and are more likely to be shareholders of their enterprises.    
7. Econometric Results 
Although Eq. 9 is estimated by different methods, conclusions will be drawn primarily 
from the firm fixed effects estimation.  The results from the pooled OLS estimation are not 
presented in Table 7 since the estimation does not control for the time-constant unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and contains the omitted variable bias.  The results from the random effects 
estimation are presented for referral purpose only, bearing in mind that the estimation assumes 
no correlation between the constant firm unobserved heterogeneity and the observed 
explanatory variables.  Such an assumption could be declined intuitively and the Hausman test 
also confirms that the random effects method would produce inconsistent estimates in this case. 
Table 7:  Equation for Relative Wages, Russian Industrial Firms, 1992-2000. 
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Table 7 presents two model specifications that use alternative measures of technological 
variables.  In all specifications, the key variables of interest are interacted with the time trend.  
To control for some data problems, two additional variables are included.  The first variable 
indicates missing or zero values on profits.20  The second variable is an interaction term between 
a dummy for year 1992 and the capital/output ratio.  The year 1992 was problematic in terms of 
accurate measures of capital since it was the first year of high inflation and the proper end-year 
capital re-valuation began only in 1993.  To reduce the effect of measurement error of capital in 
1992, the interaction term with a year dummy was included.  Appendix 3 also discusses the 
magnitude and direction of measurement error in other variables. 
Consistent with the theory described in Section 3 , the elasticity of wage ratio with 
respect to changes in employment ratio is negative.  As we would expect, the relative demand 
curve for skills is downward sloping and skill premium increases when skilled workers become 
more scarce.  The estimated elasticity of substitution between manual and non-manual workers 
(s=3.17) is above typical estimates for the U.S., the majority of which are between s=.5 and 2.5 
(see, for example, Katz and Autor, 1999).    An important implication of higher  elasticity  of 
substitution in R ussia is that in order to  achieve equivalent changes in relative wages and 
employment, Russia would require smaller supply shifts and greater demand shifts than in the 
U.S. 
    The fixed effect analysis verifies the skill-capital complementarity hypothesis, which is 
consistent with similar findings from studies on other countries (for example, Griliches, 1969; 
Bound and Johnson, 1992; Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994).  Average labor productivity 
and all time varying technological factors such as high-technology industry and new products 
are found to have a negative or zero effect on the wage ratio at the beginning of the transition 
period.    However over time, the response of wage ratio to  productivity shocks and 
technological change has become positive and significant.  The effect of time-constant foreign 
direct investment and investment abroad by Russian enterprises on wage ratio is also increasing 
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zero, all observations with zero and missing values are combined in one category.     23 
over time.  A positive rate of growth of the skill wage premium is observed among non-state 
firms and firms with positive profit. 
It  is not surprising to obtain  zero or  even  negative correlation between 
productivity/technology factors and skill wage differences during the early transition period.  
This confirms various speculations on the loose connection between tariff differentials inherited 
from the socialist period and the actual productivity contribution of workers at that time.  What 
I find puzzling is that skill wage differentials in the early 90s were growing not in the private 
sector but, rather, in the old state sector and among enterprises with a negative profit.  At this 
point I can only speculate why an early increase in skill wage premium was generated by least 
performing firms.  On the one hand, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became less constrained by 
the government tariff system and other wage floor policies.  On the other hand, compared to 
new private firms, SOEs operated under soft budget constraints and less market pressure that 
allowed them to have persistent negative profits over time.  Thus, managers of SOEs at the early 
stage of transition were able to increase salaries to themselves and their skilled  personnel 
without productivity considerations.   
From the first set of estimations, I conclude very cautiously that the increased wage 
premium has been driven by different factors during early and late transition periods.  At the 
beginning of reforms it seems that market liberalization and institutional changes played a n 
important role, whereas during the late transition period the skill wage premium evidently 
becomes more responsive to productivity and technological changes.  The next series of 
estimations will show whether these findings will hold in the workers’ sample. 
In the linked employer-employee data,  I begin by estimating the augmented wage 
function (Eq. 11), in which  firm characteristics  and time are interacted with each other and a 
dummy for non-manual workers (Table 8).  Next, firm characteristics and time are interacted 
with two categories of non-manual workers – managers and other skilled employees (Table 9).  
Managers are isolated into a separate category in order to see if our earlier suppositions on the 
role of inter-firm distribution of power are supported by the data.  To control for an unobserved 
constant individual and firm productivity, Eq. 11 is estimated by including individual fixed   24 
effects, firm fixed effects, and both individual and firm fixed effects.21  Appendix 4 shows that 
the effect of recall error on the estimated equations does not appear to be significant.  Because of 
a smaller number of firms and a larger selection of variables in the linked employer-employee 
data, I present five model specifications that have at least one productivity/technology measure 
and one measure of institutional change whenever possible. 
Table 8:  Augmented Wage Functions and Returns to a Skilled Job in the Linked Employer-Employee 
Data (Individual and Firm Fixed Effects, Russian Industry, 1985-2000). 
Table  9:  Augmented Wage Functions  and Returns to a Managerial Job  in the Linked Employer-
Employee Data (Individual and Firm Fixed Effects, Russian Industry, 1985-2000). 
All model specifications show positive and increasing over time returns to schooling, 
which is in line with the skill-biased transition picture.  Without individual fixed effects, the 
wage function with respect to  potential labor market  experience is positive and concave.  
Controlling for individual heterogeneity,  the  effect of  potential  labor market  experience 
typically disappears because of weak variation in deviation of experience from its mean over 
time.  The positive and significant coefficients on employee ownership suggest the possible 
wage rent effect for owners of the enterprise.  
Across all estimation methods, f our  of six previously used  productivity/technology 
variables have significant coefficients that are consistent with firm-level  analysis. Both 
econometric approaches provide coherent evidence on negative or zero returns to a skilled job 
in the socialist and early transition period and a consecutive rise in skill wage premium among 
firms with higher labor productivity, positive profit, foreign direct investment, and new 
products.  It is interesting that measures of technological change such as foreign direct 
investment and new products have a sizeable effect only on wages of non-managerial skilled 
workers.  The d ata do not show any significant relationship between  firm  technological 
advancements and managerial wage premium at any point of time.  However, Table 9 reveals 
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request keeping in mind  that estimates are inconsistent due to the  omitted variable bias in OLS and 
imposed assumptions in the  random effect estimation.  First differencing  transformation cannot be 
applied because of discontinuous and uneven time spells between the surveys.   25 
stronger association of managerial wage rewards with enterprise’s profit and labor productivity 
during the late transition period.   
The wage effects of two other technology measures are not straightforward.  Returns to 
having a  manual  job in  a  high technology industry were high under socialism  and then 
diminished over time.  For skilled labor, the results are ambiguous.  The signs of coefficients on 
the cross term between high technology industries and non-manual jobs are consistent with 
firm-level results but most of  the  coefficients  are statistically insignificant.   Findings on the 
effect of investment abroad disagree with firm-level estimation.  Evidently, e nterprises  that 
invested abroad have significantly higher wage returns.  However, no evidence is found in the 
individual sample of the impact of investment abroad on skill wage premium and managerial 
rewards. 
Turning to institutional factors,  two  findings are  robust  and hold t hroughout all 
estimation techniques.  First, no matter what estimation methods are used, I did not find any 
indication of the effect of strikes on skill wage premium.  Possibly, it just reflects inefficient and 
weak labor organizations inherited from the socialist times when almost 100 percent of workers 
were formally unionized.  Second,  data show substantial variation across legal and 
organizational forms of enterprises.  The hypothesis is that earnings rents should be easier to 
extract in the companies with lower control of outside shareholders.  Results unambiguously 
indicate that insider-controlled closed joint stock companies had the largest wage differences 
between manual and non-manual workers at the beginning of the transition period.  However, 
over time wage returns to skilled jobs in closed joint stock companies declined relative to other 
legal forms. 
Concerning firm ownership, wage growth is estimated to be higher in mixed and private 
firms, relative to state-owned enterprises, but the differences among these groups with respect 
to skill wage premium are much smaller than they were in our firm-level analysis.  Finally, with 
respect to the effect of legal environment, regional wage arrears are estimated to lower average 
wages but no firm conclusion could be made with respect to average skill wage differences.  At 
the same time, the firm fixed effect estimation suggests that wage returns to a managerial job   26 
during the early transition period are higher in locations where violations of labor contracts in 
the form of wage arrears are more common. 
8.  Additional Sources of the Rise in Skill Wage Inequality 
  The previous sections examined the multiple sources of increased skill wage premium 
during the transition to a market economy.  One might argue though that the list of potential 
sources is not complete and omits important factors such as within-firm organizational change, 
the transformation of the composition of firms, firm turnover, etc.  Each of these factors are 
worthy of a special study and require better data than those that we have.  Here I discuss only 
briefly the potential importance of some alternative explanations for the rise in skill wage 
inequality in transition economies. 
Organizational Change 
The nature of organizational changes in the advanced market economies is often directly 
linked to technological change.  It is commonly believed that “…these factors by themselves are 
not the major cause of the increase in inequality.  Instead they become powerful actors only by 
interacting with technical change…” (see Acemoglu, 2002).  I argue that in a transforming 
economy, organizational changes are not necessarily related to technological development and 
could have an independent effect on skill prices.  The transition to a market economy brought a 
variety of skill-favoring organizational changes within and between firms.  Old socialist firms 
have been transformed rapidly into new types of organizations with different incentives, 
management practices, ownership control, and organizational innovations.  Old departments of 
planning and socialist competition have been replaced by new departments of marketing, 
finance, logistics, pricing, etc.  Firms suddenly faced an increased demand and higher prices for 
lawyers, accountants, tax advisors, sellers, human resource managers, interpreters, and other 
market-needed skilled workers. 
  In addition to organizational reforms within firms, important changes in the overall 
composition of firms occur, for instance, workers of different skills become more segregated 
across firms.  Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Acemoglu (2002) describe this kind of structural 
changes in the U.S. economy over twenty-five years.  They argue that as the productivity of   27 
skilled workers increases, it becomes more profitable for them to work by themselves in 
separate organizations rather than in the same workplace as unskilled workers, and as a result, 
unskilled wages fall.  After eight years of transition, Russia exhibits similar changes in the 
structure of firms.  Figure 8 plots the distribution of firms by the share of non-manual workers 
in 1992, 1996, and 2000.  A clear pattern of an increase in the proportion of firms at the bottom 
and at the top of distribution indicates a higher segregation of workers of different skills across 
firms in 2000. 
Figure 8:  Distribution of Firms by the Share of Non-Manual Workers, Russian Industry. 
The effect of these and many other organizational changes on skill wage inequality is 
beyond the scope of this study and deserves further research when better data on management 
practices, organizational innovations, and firm internal structure become available. 
Firm Entry, Exit, and Decomposition of Skill Wage Differences 
Skill-favoring firm turnover is another promising area to  analyze the sources of 
increased skill wage inequality in a transition economy.  Until now we examined changes in 
relative skill prices within existing firms.  To understand better the aggregate dynamics of skill 
wage difference at the level of the whole industry, it is also important to look at the changes 
between firms and at the role of firm entry and exit in skill wage determination (see Abowd et 
al, 2002).  New firms are more likely to enter the market with new technology, new 
organizational practices, and thus higher demand for skilled workers.  By decomposing the 
wage ratio of non-manual to manual workers, we can see if the observed changes in skill wage 
inequality come from changes within the firm or from replacing old firms by new firms. 
The relative contribution of within and between c hanges in the wage ratio can be 
determined using the following decomposition proposed by Abowd et al (2002) with respect to 
the human capital index:    
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where  t w is the average wage ratio in the industrial sector; jt w is the wage ratio for an 
individual firm j; ejt is the share of employment for firm j; C is the set of continuing firms; N is 
the set of newly created firms; and D is the set of exiting firms.  The last two terms indicate that 
changes inw  might reflect differences in the wage ratio among newly created and exiting firms.  
Thus, sources of change in the wage ratio in the country industrial sector include within-firm 
changes, inter-firm shifts in employment distribution, covariance between the wage ratio and 
employment shares, and changes due to net entry.   Table 10 summarizes the decomposition of 
changes in the wage ratio in Russian industry between 1992 and 2000. 
Table 10:  Decomposition of Changes in the Wage Ratio of Non-Manual to Manual Workers in the 
Russian Industry between 1992 and 2000. 
The within-firm component is significant, suggesting that the rise in skill wage premium 
is attributed mainly to inter-firm changes within the set of continuing firms.  The between effect 
is small and it is positive only for the late transition period.  The negative cross term indicates 
that downsizing firms reduce wages of manual workers relative to non-manual workers.  
Exiting firms do not appear to contribute to increased skill wage inequality.  But entry yields a 
systematic rise in skill wage differences.  The contribution of net entry is positive with new 
firms having substantially larger skill wage differences than the exiting firms. 
  The large within-firm component  justifies studies like ours that focus primarily on 
within-firms changes in skill wage differences.  However, positive contribution of net entry also 
suggests that further research needs to be done with respect to the role of new firms in rising 
skill wage inequality in transition economies. 
9.  Conclusions 
This study attempts to explain why the transition to a market economy is skill-biased.  It 
shows unequivocal evidence on increased skill wage premium and supply of skills in transition 
economies.  It documents skill upgrading within Russian industry during the 1990s and 
examines whether similar skill–favoring shifts in the Russian and U.S. economies are driven by 
the same set of factors.     29 
The main conclusion is that there is no uni-causal and time-invariant explanation for 
skill-biased changes in wages and employment in the Russian economy.  The increased wage 
premium has been driven by different factors during the early and late transition periods.  
Jointly, three sets of factors produce a phenomenal rise in skill wage premium – from very 
compressed differences (7.5%) in 1987 to almost converging to the current U.S. wage percentage 
ratio (74.2% in Russia vs. 77.7% in the U.S.) in 2000.  
The major explanation for the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. labor market – skill-
biased technological change – is not found to be important during the socialist and early transition 
periods.  Moreover, the statistical relationship between technology factors and skill wage 
differences in early 90s was often zero or even negative.  However, at the late stage of transition, 
wages for non-manual workers are becoming more responsive to domestically-generated skill-
biased technological change and technology-enhancing foreign direct investment.     
Our analysis provides strong support for the market adjustment hypothesis, which implies 
that market liberalization decompresses earnings restrictions imposed by the old socialist wage-
setting mechanism and adjusts wage ratio to the true differences in marginal productivity.  
There is strong evidence showing the adjustment of skill wage premium to labor productivity 
and the time effect on skill wage premium.    
Finally, this study has shown that non-market institutional forces also produce skill-biased 
changes in the wage structure,  especially during the early stage of the transition period.  
However, traditional institutional factors that are most frequently mentioned in the U.S. studies 
of wage inequality – reduced value of minimum wages and de-unionization – do not appear to 
be significant in the case of Russia.  The contribution of institutional factors to wage inequality 
during the early transition is attributed mainly to managerial power to extract earnings rents 
without productivity considerations  under soft budget constraints,  the  lack of control by 
outside shareholders, and weak legal environment.  Legal and organizational structure of the 
enterprise, access to subsidies, and in some  instances ownership and violations of labor 
contracts are found to be important causes for increased skill wage premium in Russia. 
This  study evaluated  all of these factors and provided  a  general theoretical and 
empirical methodology for understanding increased wage premium of skilled workers during   30 
the transition to a market economy.  Empirical analysis has been carefully designed and 
implemented on the base of administrative enterprises’ reports and linked employer-employee 
data, with a special emphasis on data quality, variable definitions, measurement errors, and 
retrospective biases.  Unique data  were allowed to exploit the rich set of variables, many of 
which have never  or rarely been  used in the Western studies of wage inequality, such as 
manufacturing of high-technology and new products, foreign direct investment, investment 
abroad, ownership, legal organizational forms, and legal environment. 
U.S. experts in wages and employment might notice that  Russia today experiences 
changes that are quite similar to the ones that the U.S. economy went through over the last 
decades, including a decline in low-skilled workers, an increase in skill wage inequality, and 
higher responsiveness of relative wages to  organizational and technological change 
accompanied by productivity growth.  In Russia all these changes are more compressed in time 
and reinforced by market adjustment and some peculiar non-market institutions.  Although 
there is a long way to go, however, the fact that markets began to work gives certain optimism 
on future organizational and technological development that could hopefully lead to the 
decades of increased productivity and performance. 
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Table 1:  Evidence on Skill Upgrading in Transition Economies 
1A:  Share of Non-Manual Workers (percentage of total employment), 1990-2000 
  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
Transition economies             
Croatia  …  …  …  52.2  55.4  58.6 
Czech Republic  …  …  52.7  54.7  55.7  56.8 
Estonia  47.1  48.4  51.5  54.0  53.3  55.0 
Hungary  …  …  …  54.3  54.3  55.5 
Latvia  …  …  …  47.7  48.4  53.4 
Lithuania  …  …  …  …  46.5  47.5 
Poland  …  …  …  43.8  46.4  48.2 
Romania  …  …  26.2  27.8  27.4  27.3 
Russian Federation  50.4  …  52.7  54.2  55.7  56.1 
Slovak Republic  …  …  51.5  52.5  52.4  54.5 
Slovenia  …  …  52.2  53.3  51.4  55.0 
Ukraine  …  …  …  46.2  50.2  50.5 
Developed market economies (for comparison)         
Canada  65.0  66.9  66.6  66.4  66.3  66.6 
Finland  63.0  65.5  65.8  66.4  67.4  65.8 
Italy  …  …  56.0  57.7  59.0  60.6 
Japan  57.0  58.3  58.8  59.5  60.5  61.0 
Spain  50.4  52.4  49.6  51.8  52.4  53.5 
Sweden  67.2  69.4  71.1  71.0  69.3  70.5 
United Kingdom  …  67.0  68.3  69.4  70.3  … 
United States  70.3  71.3  71.6  72.1  72.5  72.9 
Source:  RLMS for Russia; the ILO Laborstat database (available at www.ilo.org) for other countries 
Notes:  Original data come from national labor force surveys.  Non-manual workers include legislators, 
managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, service workers, and army specialists.  Numbers in white cells 
are calculated based on ISCO-88.  Numbers in gray cells are based on ISCO-68.   
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Table 1:  Evidence on Skill Upgrading in Transition Economies  
1B:  Share of the Employed with Higher Professional Education (percentage of total 
employment), 1992-2000 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Transition economies 
Bulgaria  …  20.1  21.3  21.3  20.7  21.5  …  …  … 
Czech Republic  …  10.5  10.1  10.9  10.8  10.8  10.8  11.4  11.8 
Hungary  14.6  14.7  14.6  15.8  16.5  15.1  16.1  16.4  17.5 
Poland  14.2  13.7  14.8  15.2  15.0  15.4  16.2  17.2  17.3 
Romania  …  …   8.0   8.1   7.8   8.1  …  …  … 
Russian Federation  16.1  16.9  18.0  18.4  18.8  20.1  20.7  20.2  21.6 
Slovak Republic  …  13.3  12.7  12.5  12.6  11.9  11.8  11.8  12.3 
For comparison 
United States  26.4  27.0  27.3  28.3  28.5  28.6  29.1  30.0  … 
Sources:  OECD, Statistical Abstract of the United States/The National Data Book, Goskomstat (1999 and 2001a). 
Notes:  Higher professional education in former socialist countries includes only universities and does not include 
technical colleges and vocational schools.  Typically technical schools train associate professionals, e.g. nurses, 
technicians, teachers for elementary school and kindergartens.  For U.S. – percentage of civilian labor force.    33 
Table 1:  Evidence on Skill Upgrading in Transition Economies 
1C:  Percentage Wage Differences between Non-Manual and Manual Employees in Industry/ 
Manufacturing 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  Notes  Sources 
Transition economies           
Bulgaria  0.048  0.066  0.109  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Czechoslovakia  0.087  0.081  0.068  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Czech Republic  0.071  0.057  0.058  0.521  0.771  Industry  NSY 
Hungary  0.218  0.355  0.763  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Hungary  …  …  0.647  1.022  1.229  Industry  NSY 
Poland  0.012  -0.029  0.177  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Romania  0.310  0.172  0.196  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Romania  0.313  0.173  0.191  0.336  0.493  Industry, 99  NSY 
Russian 
Federation 
0.101  0.060  0.197  0.541  0.742  Industry  NSY 
Developed market economies (for comparison)         
Canada  0.292  0.387  0.419  0.422  …  Manufacturing, 94  IIS, OECD 
Finland  0.492  0.506  0.467  …  …  Industry  IIS 
Finland  0.463  0.500  0.466  0.399  0.385  Industry, 98  NSY 
Italy  0.308  0.416  0.645  …  …  Industry, 89  IIS 
Spain  0.387  0.499  0.642  …  …  Manufacturing  IIS 
Sweden  0.553  0.492  0.508  …  …  Manufacturing  IIS 
United Kingdom  0.308  0.366  0.488  …  …  Manufacturing  IIS 
United States  0.533  0.559  0.640  …  …  Manufacturing  IIS 
United States  0.534  0.557  0.641  0.699  0.777  Manufacturing  NSY 
West Germany  0.530  0.587  0.614  …  …  Manufacturing  IIS 
Source:  “NSY” stands for national statistical yearbooks.  “IIS” denotes United Nations Industrial Statistics 
Yearbooks, 1980-1991.  “OECD” denotes OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services - Industrial Surveys.  
After 1991 the UN stopped collecting data on wages and salaries of manual workers.  Industry includes mining, 
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, and gas. 
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Table 2:  Linked Employer-Employee Data:  Sample Construction and Variable 
Availability 
  1985  1990  1994  1995  1996  1998  2000 
Initial number of RLMS respondents 
Of which:  7,074  7,076  8,893  8,417  8,342  8,701  9,074 
Number of RLMS industrial employees 
Of which:  1,465  1,504  1,369  1,270  1,163  1,109  1,140 
- matched with the RPP data (%)  80.7  81.1  82.1  84.3  85.8  82.1  77.0 
Number of RLMS agricultural 
employees 
Of which: 
690  659  554  513  486  416  440 
- matched with the RSP data (%)  …  …  …  90.8  88.3  86.5  83.9 
Number of firms in the linked 
employer-employee sample*  452  471  489  547  531  472  423 
Number of workers in the linked 
employer-employee sample  1,182  1,219  1,124  1,537  1,427  1,270  1,247 
RLMS variables: wages, gender, 
schooling, occupation,  industry, 
experience, employee ownership 
+  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Regional variables:  strikes, wage 
arrears  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
RPP variables:  employment of manual 
and non-manual workers, output, 
fixed assets, ownership, location, 
industry 
+  +  +  +  +  +  + 
RPP variables:  wages of manual and 
non-manual workers, new 
products, foreign direct investment 
…  …  +  +  +  +  + 
Notes:  RLMS = Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey; RPP = the Registry of Industrial Enterprises; RSP = the 
Registry of Agricultural Enterprises.  (*) The firms in the linked employer-employee data are drawn from the RPP 
and RSP data and matched with RLMS industrial and agricultural employees; (…) variables are not available; (+) 
variables are available.   35 
 
 
Table 3:  Wage and Employment Ratios of Non-Manual to Manual Workers in the Firm Sample, 1992-2000 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
 
1.62  1.73  1.72  1.79  1.88  1.88  1.92  1.94  2.06  Wage ratio of non-manual to 
manual workers  (1.79)  (2.34)  (0.83)  (1.45)  (1.67)  (2.63)  (2.53)  (2.40)  (3.31) 
 
0.25  0.27  0.28  0.29  0.34  0.37  0.44  0.51  0.53  Employment ratio of non-
manual to manual workers  (0.37)  (0.48)  (0.64)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.78)  (1.02)  (1.62)  (1.91) 
                   
N  18,185  22,017  23,425  24,171  22,474  23,546  23,734  24,500  24,193 
For reference:                   
Number of unique IDs in the 
original data set  24,792  23,052  24,359  24,894  27,985  25,194  27,026  26,984  27,337 
Number of firms after the 
process of cleaning  23,013  22,135  23,617  24,350  27,461  24,763  26,354  26,551  26,903 
Notes:  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.  Sample (N) consists of industrial firms with non-missing values of the wage ratio.     36 
Table 4:  Measures of Technological Change in Russia 
Technology Measures  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
Share of industrial equipment less than 5 
years old (%) 
22.8  14.7  7.2  4.1  4.7 
Number of R&D workers, thousands of 
people 
1532.6  1106.3  990.7  855.2  887.7 
Federal budget for science in percent of GDP 
(%) 
0.50  0.39  0.27  0.23  0.24 
Number of industrial enterprises with R&D 
departments 
340  276  342  240  284 
R&D expenditures in the business sector in 
percent of GDP (%) 
0.74  0.84  0.90  0.92  1.09 
Number of new patents, thousands 
 
13.2  20.6  19.7  23.3  17.6 
Number of valid patents, thousands 
 
44.3  60.3  109.5  173.1  144.3 
Possession of personal computers                   
per 100 households 
1.7 
 
2.4  3.1 
 
5.1  6.8 
 
Domestic production of personal computers, 
thousands of units 
137  82.1  118  62  26.5 
Number of internet users,                  
thousands 
1.0 
 
80  300 
 
1,000  3,931.8 
 
Number of mobile phone users, thousands 
 
6.0  27.7  233.5  761.7  3,331.2 
Telephone lines in use per 100 people  16.7 
 
17.6  18.7 
 
20.6  22.8 
 
Sources:  Goskomstat (2001b) and Euromonitor (www.euromonitor.com). 
Notes:  Information on patents is for 1993.     37 
Table 5:  Characteristics of the Firm Sample, 1995 and 2000 
Variable Name  1995  2000 
Declining 
wage ratio 
1995-2000 
Growing wage 
ratio 1995-2000 
Capital/output ratio  26.323  40.678  28.640  93.048 
  (1722.797)  (2940.708)  (801.139)  (5132.683) 
  [23,402]  [21,967]  [5,876]  [7,061] 
Ever received FDI during 1994-2000  0.016  0.045  0.016  0.031 
Ever invested abroad during 1994-2000  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.010 
Produced new products in a given year  0.030  0.012  0.012  0.017 
  [18,976]  [17,439]  [5,145]  [6,247] 
High-technology industries  0.047  0.026  0.026  0.029 
4.879  6.029  4.967  5.921  Labor productivity (thousands rubles, in 
constant 1990 prices)  (8.795)  (30.115)  (7.388)  (9.502) 
  [23,751]  [23,279]  [5,984]  [7,164] 
Profit         
Profit negative  0.235  0.335  0.366  0.331 
Profit zero or missing  0.084  0.114  0.075  0.056 
Profit positive  0.682  0.551  0.559  0.613 
Ownership   [24,163]  [24,193]  [6,212]  [7,371] 
State   0.191  0.279  0.186  0.161 
Mixed  0.458  0.240  0.295  0.316 
Private  0.351  0.482  0.519  0.523 
Industry         
Energy / Fuel  0.054  0.071  0.049  0.062 
Metallurgy  0.026  0.019  0.015  0.026 
Chemicals  0.026  0.027  0.027  0.032 
Machine building  0.244  0.224  0.203  0.238 
Building materials  0.122  0.110  0.113  0.096 
Wood processing  0.106  0.089  0.107  0.110 
Light  0.119  0.127  0.136  0.105 
Food  0.237  0.204  0.259  0.252 
Other manufacturing  0.066  0.130  0.090  0.078 
N  24,171  24,193  6,212  7,371 
Notes:  Sample (N) consists of industrial firms with non-missing values of the wage and employment ratios.  
Standard deviations for continuous variables are shown in parentheses and number of observations for 
variables with missing values is in brackets.   38 
Table 6:  Characteristics of the Individual Sample 
Variable Name 
Manual 
Workers 
(2) 
Non-Manual 
Workers 
(1) 
t-test for 
difference 
(1)-(2) 
Capital/output ratio  31.596 
(969.656) 
[4286] 
93.750 
(2420.229) 
[2263] 
-1.472 
Ever received FDI during 
1994-2000 
0.072  0.077  -0.815 
Ever invested abroad   0.087  0.086  0.119 
Produced new products 
during 1993-2000 
0.128 
[4816] 
0.154 
[2644] 
-3.101a 
High-tech industries  0.063  0.095  -5.391a 
Labor productivity 
(thousands rubles, in 
constant 1990 prices) 
12.390 
(25.260) 
[4153] 
13.438 
(21.623) 
[2209] 
-1.654c 
Profit       
Negative  0.220  0.182  4.103a 
Zero or missing  0.226  0.259  -3.269a 
Positive  0.553  0.560  -0.541 
Ownership        
State   0.401  0.450  -4.313a 
Mixed  0.280  0.318  -3.550a 
Private  0.319  0.232  8.297a 
Legal Form       
State unitary  0.398  0.441  -3.682a 
Partnerships and coops  0.142  0.071  9.537a 
Open joint stocks  0.360  0.410  -4.410a 
Closed joint stocks  0.099  0.078  3.111a 
N  5225  2862   
 
 
 
  
Variable Name 
Manual 
Workers 
(2) 
Non-Manual 
Workers 
(1) 
t-test for 
difference 
(1)-(2) 
Log of real monthly 
average wages  
9.422 
(0.921) 
9.481 
(0.838) 
-2.854a 
Schooling (years)  10.194 
(2.327) 
12.760 
(2.076) 
-49.231a 
Experience (years)  23.724 
(12.560) 
20.770 
(10.889) 
10.590a 
Regional wage arrears  1.992 
(2.908) 
1.632 
(2.552) 
5.553a 
Regional strikes  64.328 
(139.275) 
64.998 
(146.406) 
-0.203 
Employee ownership       
Employee has no shares  0.735  0.715  1.885c 
Employee has shares  0.181  0.234  -5.752a 
No information  0.084  0.050  5.642a 
Industry       
Energy / Fuel  0.092  0.106  -1.900c 
Metallurgy  0.087  0.100  -1.937c 
Chemicals  0.061  0.057  0.745 
Machine building  0.293  0.381  -8.108a 
Building materials  0.055  0.037  3.506a 
Wood processing  0.050  0.058  -1.521 
Light  0.047  0.049  -0.339 
Food  0.075  0.084  -1.470 
Other manufacturing  0.034  0.028  1.584 
Agriculture  0.206  0.101  12.119a 
N  5225  2862   
 
Notes:  Sample (N) consists of industrial firms with non-missing values of individual wages and schooling.  Standard deviations for continuous variables are 
shown in parentheses and number of observations for variables with missing values is in brackets.  a significant at 1% level;  b significant at 5% level;  c 
significant at 10% level.   39 
Table 7:  Equations for Relative Wages in the Firm Sample, Russian Industry, 1992-2000 
Dependent Variable -  Firm Fixed Effect  Firm Random Effect 
Log (Wage ratio)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Log(employment ratio)  -0.316a  -112.50  -0.346a  -104.64  -0.247a  -111.21  -0.284a  -106.09 
Log(capital/output)  0.019a  6.16  0.022a  5.80  -0.005b  -1.97  -0.002  -0.54 
Log(capital/output)*time  0.003a  5.78  0.002a  3.67  0.004a  9.39  0.003a  6.52 
High-tech industries  -0.062b  -2.39  ?  ?  -0.041a  -3.16  ?  ? 
High-tech industries*time  0.018a  6.88  ?  ?  0.020a  8.68  ?  ? 
Ever received FDI*time  0.010a  3.80  ?  ?  0.012a  7.81  ?  ? 
New products  ?  ?  -0.039b  -2.43  ?  ?  -0.046a  -3.43 
New products *time  ?  ?  0.007b  2.16  ?  ?  0.011a  3.49 
Ever invested abroad*time  ?  ?  0.010c  1.79  ?  ?  0.006  1.48 
Log(labor productivity)  -0.010a  -2.66  -0.013a  -3.01  -0.036a  -13.14  -0.039a  -11.46 
Log(labor productivity)*time  0.002a  3.39  0.002a  3.47  0.005a  10.06  0.005a  8.69 
Profit (negative profit is omitted)                 
Positive  -0.024a  -3.43  -0.019b  -2.45  -0.015b  -2.30  -0.012c  -1.64 
Positive*time  0.004a  2.73  0.003b  2.28  0.003b  2.38  0.003b  2.16 
Missing or zero  -0.025b  -2.02  -0.016  -1.02  -0.012  -1.08  -0.010  -0.73 
Missing or zero*time  0.001  0.25  -0.002a  -0.53  -0.002  -0.86  -0.002  -0.91 
Ownership (state is omitted)                 
Mixed  -0.031a  -5.11  -0.029a  -4.19  -0.022a  -3.93  -0.021a  -3.28 
Mixed*time  0.009a  6.06  0.009a  5.24  0.006a  4.81  0.005a  3.25 
Private  -0.020a  -2.87  -0.017b  -2.04  -0.015b  -2.39  -0.015b  -2.06 
Private*time  0.006a  4.15  0.005a  3.33  0.004a  3.27  0.003c  1.93 
Intercept  -0.071b  -2.06  -0.104b  -2.51  0.013  1.25  -0.049a  -4.22 
Hausman test of RE vs. FE ? chi2(33)   ?  ?  1928.41  1271.45 
R2 overall  0.055  0.074  0.081  0.097 
N  190,235  143,315  190,235  143,315 
Note: a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at 10% level.  Year dummies, 9 industry dummies, and a dummy for 1992 
capital/output mismeasurement are included but not shown here (see description in the text).     40 
Table 8:  Augmented Wage Functions and Returns to a Skilled Job in the Linked Employer-
Employee Data (Individual and Firm Fixed Effects, Russian Industry, 1985-2000) 
  Individual Fixed 
Effect 
Firm  
Fixed Effect 
Individual and 
Firm Fixed Effects 
  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Specification 1:             
Schooling (years)  0.005  0.09  0.017b  2.15  0.008  0.14 
Schooling*time  0.003a  2.93  0.002a  3.10  0.003a  2.63 
Experience (years)  0.041  0.78  0.024a  9.75  0.043  0.81 
Experience squared / 100  -0.026b  -2.56  -0.041a  -8.30  -0.023b  -2.08 
Employee has shares  0.048c  1.89  0.114a  5.15  0.046c  1.75 
No information on employee shares  -0.006  -0.16  0.020  0.62  -0.013  -0.35 
High-tech industries  0.045  0.38  0.411a  2.61  0.288c  1.67 
High-tech industries*time  -0.017c  -1.79  -0.020b  -2.31  -0.020b  -2.00 
High-tech industries*SKL  -0.187  -1.17  -0.328a  -2.79  -0.185  -1.00 
High-tech industries*SKL*time  0.010  0.70  0.009  0.72  0.012  0.80 
Profit zero or missing  0.171a  4.39  0.191a  4.88  0.196a  4.78 
Profit positive  0.154b  2.42  0.258a  4.33  0.155b  2.31 
Profit positive*time  -0.008c  -1.75  -0.010b  -2.23  -0.009c  -1.67 
Profit positive*SKL  -0.237a  -3.33  -0.349a  -6.06  -0.237a  -3.17 
Profit positive*SKL*time  0.019a  3.27  0.018a  3.45  0.020a  3.25 
Intercept  8.502a  6.48  8.715a  25.35  8.720a  5.94 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.096/0.170  0.092/0.050  0.150/0.086 
Specification 2:             
Ever received FDI*time  0.004  0.60  0.000  0.04  0.011  1.21 
Ever received FDI*SKL  -0.392b  -2.12  -0.544a  -4.01  -0.231  -1.04 
Ever received FDI*SKL*time  0.036a  2.68  0.041a  3.44  0.028c  1.93 
Regional wage arrears  -0.072b  -2.08  -0.080b  -2.40  -0.067c  -1.91 
Regional wage arrears*time  0.003  1.29  0.003  1.50  0.003  1.25 
Regional wage arrears*SKL  -0.038  -0.82  -0.125a  -3.06  -0.028  -0.59 
Regional wage arrears*SKL*time   0.003  0.91  0.008a  2.88  0.002  0.66 
Intercept  8.103a  6.23  8.947a  27.05  8.401a  5.79 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.091/0.156  0.083/0.070  0.143/0.030 
Specification 3:             
Ever invested abroad*time  0.028a  4.15  0.036a  4.97  0.033a  4.16 
Ever invested abroad*SKL  -0.352c  -1.79  0.045  0.33  -0.321  -1.41 
Ever invested abroad*SKL*time  0.005  0.42  -0.002  -0.16  -0.002  -0.16 
Legal form (Closed joint stocks are 
omitted)             
State unitary  0.551a  2.57  0.582a  2.80  0.503b  2.30 
Partnerships and coops  0.739a  2.78  0.823a  3.30  0.702a  2.57 
Open joint stocks  0.346c  1.68  0.470b  2.36  0.347c  1.64 
State unitary*time  -0.045a  -2.66  -0.039b  -2.32  -0.034c  -1.93   41 
Partnerships and coops*time  -0.064a  -3.10  -0.071a  -3.68  -0.062a  -2.91 
Open joint stocks*time  -0.026c  -1.65  -0.030c  -1.95  -0.021  -1.27 
State unitary*SKL  -0.262a  -4.29  -0.390a  -8.72  -0.295a  -4.53 
Partnerships and coops*SKL  -0.386  -0.94  -0.199  -0.57  -0.295  -0.70 
Open joint stocks*SKL  -0.342b  -2.08  -0.632a  -4.25  -0.359b  -2.14 
State unitary*SKL*time  0.030a  4.55  0.024a  4.67  0.032a  4.60 
Partnerships and coops*SKL*time  0.037  1.10  0.017  0.61  0.028  0.83 
Open joint stocks*SKL*time  0.025b  2.00  0.037a  3.26  0.026b  2.05 
Intercept  7.869a  6.00  8.353a  21.55  8.174a  5.56 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.098/0.176  0.097/0.087  0.153/0.089 
Specification 4:             
Log(labor productivity)  -0.006  -0.16  0.062c  1.70  -0.006  -0.14 
Log(labor productivity)*time  0.012a  3.59  0.007b  2.55  0.012a  3.61 
Log(labor productivity)*SKL  -0.098a  -3.83  -0.126a  -6.71  -0.104a  -3.85 
Log(labor productivity)*SKL*time  0.008a  2.73  0.007a  3.31  0.008b  2.56 
Ownership (State is omitted)             
Mixed  -0.495b  -2.36  -0.555a  -2.76  -0.518b  -2.42 
Private  -0.442b  -2.15  -0.327c  -1.64  -0.490b  -2.33 
Mixed*time  0.048a  2.76  0.051a  3.02  0.050a  2.80 
Private*time  0.042a  2.59  0.026c  1.65  0.046a  2.71 
Mixed*SKL  -0.128  -0.58  -0.262  -1.31  -0.140  -0.62 
Private*SKL  -0.138  -0.59  -0.202  -0.94  -0.073  -0.31 
Mixed*SKL*time  0.009  0.49  0.014  0.85  0.010  0.51 
Private*SKL*time  0.008  0.46  0.015  0.89  0.003  0.19 
Intercept  7.660a  5.19  8.340a  29.85  7.909a  4.75 
N  6362  6362  6362 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.118/0.171  0.107/0.078  0.151/0.035 
Specification 5:             
Produced new products*time  -0.004  -0.68  -0.010  -1.55  -0.013c  -1.90 
Produced new products*SKL  -0.208c  -1.63  -0.394a  -3.95  -0.485a  -3.09 
Produced new products*SKL*time  0.016c  1.66  0.017c  1.87  0.027a  2.59 
Regional strikes/100  -0.101  -1.37  -0.062  -0.85  -0.121  -1.62 
Regional strikes*time  0.008  1.42  0.005  0.88  0.010c  1.72 
Regional strikes*SKL  0.050  0.48  -0.054  -0.56  0.055  0.51 
Regional strikes*SKL*time  -0.003  -0.41  0.004  0.48  -0.004  -0.48 
Intercept  7.307a  5.00  8.586a  29.43  7.055a  3.62 
N  7460  7460  7460 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.088/0.073  0.080/0.034  0.136/0.039 
Notes: a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at 10% level.  SKL= non-manual workers 
including managers, professionals, associate professionals, clerks, service workers, and army specialists.  Year 
dummies and 9 industry dummies are included but not shown here.  Specifications 2 through 5 also include 
schooling, experience, and employee ownership.  Time-invariant variables such as gender and location are 
dropped.  The individual fixed effect model is estimated for 2,729-3,214 individuals.  The firm fixed effect 
model is estimated for 764-891 firms.     42 
 
Table 9:  Augmented Wage Functions and Returns to a Managerial Job in the Linked 
Employer-Employee Data (Individual and Firm Fixed Effects, Russian Industry, 1985-2000) 
  Individual Fixed 
Effect 
Firm Fixed Effect  Individual and 
Firm Fixed Effects 
  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Specification 1:             
Schooling (years)  0.004  0.07  0.015b  1.97  0.007  0.13 
Schooling*time  0.003a  2.79  0.002a  3.07  0.002b  2.53 
Experience (years)  0.040  0.76  0.024a  9.69  0.042  0.80 
Experience squared / 100  -0.027a  -2.65  -0.041a  -8.36  -0.024b  -2.15 
Employee has shares  0.048c  1.89  0.114a  5.13  0.046c  1.74 
No information on employee shares  -0.006  -0.16  0.020  0.63  -0.013  -0.35 
High-tech industries  0.046  0.39  0.411a  2.60  0.289c  1.67 
High-tech industries*time  -0.017c  -1.78  -0.020b  -2.31  -0.020b  -1.99 
High-tech industries*MGR  -0.203  -0.27  -0.826  -1.46  -0.180  -0.24 
High-tech industries*MGR*time  0.002  0.03  0.040  0.77  -0.007  -0.11 
High-tech industries*SKL  -0.190  -1.19  -0.312a  -2.64  -0.188  -1.02 
High-tech industries*SKL*time  0.010  0.71  0.008  0.70  0.012  0.80 
Profit zero or missing  0.171a  4.40  0.191a  4.88  0.196a  4.80 
Profit positive  0.154b  2.42  0.260a  4.36  0.155b  2.31 
Profit positive*time  -0.008c  -1.75  -0.010b  -2.27  -0.009c  -1.67 
Profit positive*MGR  -0.403b  -2.51  -0.263c  -1.89  -0.367b  -2.24 
Profit positive*MGR*time  0.028b  2.00  0.036a  2.90  0.025c  1.78 
Profit positive*SKL  -0.219a  -3.00  -0.353a  -6.00  -0.223a  -2.91 
Profit positive*SKL*time  0.018a  3.02  0.016a  3.09  0.019a  3.06 
Intercept  8.531a  6.50  8.727a  25.41  8.792a  5.97 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.096/0.175  0.095/0.051  0.150/0.011 
Specification 2:             
Ever received FDI*time  0.004  0.60  0.001  0.06  0.011  1.21 
Ever received FDI*MGR  -0.400  -0.65  -0.296  -0.84  -0.215  -0.35 
Ever received FDI*MGR*time  0.048  1.36  0.055c  1.64  0.040  1.14 
Ever received FDI*SKL  -0.375b  -1.97  -0.558a  -3.99  -0.211  -0.93 
Ever received FDI*SKL*time  0.035b  2.45  0.041a  3.31  0.027c  1.74 
Regional wage arrears  -0.070b  -2.03  -0.075b  -2.27  -0.066c  -1.87 
Regional wage arrears*time  0.003  1.24  0.003  1.36  0.003  1.2 
Regional wage arrears*MGR  -0.030  -0.21  0.220c  1.89  -0.028  -0.2 
Regional wage arrears*MGR*time   0.004  0.45  -0.012  -1.50  0.004  0.43 
Regional wage arrears*SKL  -0.029  -0.60  -0.128a  -3.00  -0.017  -0.35 
Regional wage arrears*SKL*time   0.002  0.61  0.008a  2.69  0.001  0.35 
Intercept  8.286a  6.34  8.972a  27.17  8.999a  6.21 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.091/0.185  0.086/0.071  0.143/0.040 
   43 
Specification 3:             
Ever invested abroad*time  0.028a  4.17  0.036a  5.00  0.033a  4.17 
Ever invested abroad*MGR  0.408  0.71  0.590  1.58  0.438  0.75 
Ever invested abroad*MGR*time  -0.022  -0.66  -0.028  -0.86  -0.028  -0.83 
Ever invested abroad*SKL  -0.394b  -1.97  -0.003  -0.02  -0.369  -1.59 
Ever invested abroad*SKL*time  0.008  0.61  0.002  0.19  0.001  0.04 
Legal form (Closed joint stocks are 
omitted)             
State unitary  0.546b  2.54  0.598a  2.88  0.494b  2.26 
Partnerships and coops  0.734a  2.76  0.839a  3.37  0.693b  2.54 
Open joint stocks  0.339c  1.65  0.479b  2.41  0.337  1.60 
State unitary*time  -0.045a  -2.63  -0.040b  -2.42  -0.033c  -1.89 
Partnerships and coops*time  -0.064a  -3.09  -0.072a  -3.74  -0.061a  -2.89 
Open joint stocks*time  -0.026  -1.62  -0.032b  -2.02  -0.020  -1.23 
State unitary*MGR  -0.662a  -4.71  -0.364a  -3.13  -0.685a  -4.68 
Partnerships and coops*MGR  0.173  0.15  0.386  0.33  0.008  0.01 
Open joint stocks*MGR  -0.340  -0.73  -0.673  -1.61  -0.405  -0.87 
State unitary*MGR*time  0.069a  4.32  0.047a  3.33  0.066a  3.90 
Partnerships and coops*MGR*time  -0.020  -0.22  -0.017  -0.18  -0.009  -0.09 
Open joint stocks*MGR*time  0.013  0.37  0.066b  2.08  0.017  0.47 
State unitary*SKL  -0.217a  -3.46  -0.388a  -8.46  -0.250a  -3.75 
Partnerships and coops*SKL  -0.451  -1.05  -0.241  -0.68  -0.338  -0.77 
Open joint stocks*SKL  -0.321c  -1.90  -0.601a  -3.95  -0.335c  -1.95 
State unitary*SKL*time  0.025a  3.75  0.023a  4.24  0.028a  3.94 
Partnerships and coops*SKL*time  0.043  1.26  0.019  0.69  0.033  0.94 
Open joint stocks*SKL*time  0.024c  1.91  0.033a  2.81  0.025b  1.97 
Intercept  7.914a  6.04  8.360a  21.62  8.575a  5.94 
N  8087  8087  8087 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.101/0.183  0.101/0.089  0.155/0.031 
Specification 4:             
Log(labor productivity)  -0.004  -0.10  0.053  1.46  -0.003  -0.08 
Log(labor productivity)*time  0.011a  3.56  0.008a  2.73  0.012a  3.56 
Log(labor productivity)*MGR  -0.180a  -3.39  -0.092b  -2.07  -0.180a  -3.24 
Log(labor productivity)*MGR*time  0.014b  2.31  0.007  1.51  0.014b  2.13 
Log(labor productivity)*SKL  -0.087a  -3.28  -0.130a  -6.69  -0.093a  -3.35 
Log(labor productivity)*SKL*time  0.007b  2.38  0.007a  3.40  0.007b  2.27 
Ownership (State is omitted)             
Mixed  -0.493b  -2.35  -0.558a  -2.78  -0.520b  -2.43 
Private  -0.436b  -2.12  -0.336c  -1.69  -0.487b  -2.32 
Mixed*time  0.048a  2.75  0.051a  3.02  0.050a  2.79 
Private*time  0.042b  2.55  0.027c  1.71  0.045a  2.69 
Mixed*MGR  -0.203  -0.30  -0.990c  -1.83  -0.230  -0.34 
Private*MGR  0.047  0.07  0.153  0.25  0.053  0.08 
Mixed*MGR*time  0.001  0.02  0.096b  2.23  0.003  0.06 
Private*MGR*time  -0.008  -0.17  0.002  0.05  -0.008  -0.17   44 
Mixed*SKL  -0.125  -0.55  -0.170  -0.83  -0.134  -0.58 
Private*SKL  -0.172  -0.71  -0.215  -0.98  -0.097  -0.40 
Mixed*SKL*time  0.010  0.54  0.004  0.26  0.011  0.55 
Private*SKL*time  0.011  0.59  0.013  0.79  0.005  0.28 
Intercept  7.646a  5.17  8.398a  30.07  6.548a  3.35 
N  6362  6362  6362 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.119/0.171  0.112/0.080  0.152/0.175 
Specification 5:             
Produced new products*time  -0.004  -0.68  -0.010  -1.56  -0.013c  -1.89 
Produced new products*MGR  0.209  0.18  -0.281  -0.48  0.053  0.05 
Produced new products*MGR*time  -0.021  -0.22  0.056  0.94  -0.033  -0.33 
Produced new products*SKL  -0.207  -1.62  -0.395a  -3.96  -0.485a  -3.09 
Produced new products*SKL*time  0.016c  1.67  0.017c  1.88  0.027a  2.60 
Regional strikes/100  -0.101  -1.38  -0.060  -0.83  -0.121  -1.62 
Regional strikes*time  0.008  1.42  0.005  0.86  0.010c  1.72 
Regional strikes*MGR  0.065  0.17  0.334  1.09  0.112  0.30 
Regional strikes*MGR*time  -0.003  -0.09  -0.017  -0.71  -0.007  -0.23 
Regional strikes*SKL  0.052  0.49  -0.085  -0.85  0.054  0.50 
Regional strikes*SKL*time  -0.004  -0.43  0.005  0.71  -0.004  -0.48 
Intercept  7.330a  5.01  8.996a  50.90  6.897a  3.44 
N  7460  7460  7460 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.088/0.074  0.083/0.030  0.136/0.047 
Notes: a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at 10% level.  MAN=managers; SKL=other 
non-manual workers including professionals, associate professionals, clerks, s ervice workers, and army 
specialists.  Year dummies and 9 industry dummies are included in all specifications but not shown here.   
Specifications 2 through 5 also  include  schooling, experience, and employee ownership.  Time-invariant 
variables such as gender and location are dropped.  The individual fixed effect model is estimated for 2,729-
3,214 individuals.  The firm fixed effect model is estimated for 764-891 firms.   
 
 
 
 
Table 10:  Decomposition of Changes in the Wage Ratio of Non-Manual to Manual Workers 
in the Russian Industry between 1992 and 2000 
Period  Total  Within  Between  Cross  Entry  Exit  N 
1992-2000  0.385  0.331  -0.019  -0.052  0.127  -0.002  38,919 
1992-1996  0.146  0.139  -0.014  -0.015  0.039  -0.002  35,113 
1996-2000  0.240  0.231  0.026  -0.053  0.045  -0.010  42,359 
Notes:  Decomposition has been performed on the set of industries and regions for which information is 
available for all years.  Partially missing industries, such as defense industry and production of gold and 
precious metals, and partially missing regions, such as Ingush and Chechen Republics, are excluded from 
decomposition calculations. 
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Figure 1:  Returns to a Year of Schooling in Transition Economies, 1984-2000
Notes:  CZ=Czech Republic (Chase, 1998;  Filer et al., 1999; Munich et al., 1999; Vecernik, 2001); HU=Hungary 
(Kertesi and Kollo, 2002);  PL=Poland (Rutkowski, 1996); RU=Russia (Brainerd, 1998; author's calculations); 
SK=Slovak Republic (Chase, 1998;  Filer et al., 1999).
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Figure 2:  Returns to a Year of University Education in Transition Economies, 1984-2000
Notes:  CZ=Czech Republic (Filer et al., 1999; Vecernik, 2001); HU=Hungary (Kertesi and Kollo, 2002);  PL=Poland 
(Rutkowski, 1996); RU=Russia (Brainerd, 1998; author's calculations); SK=Slovak Republic (Filer et al., 1999); 
SL=Slovenia (Vodopivec, 2002).
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Figure 3:   Percentage Wage Differences between Non-Manual and Manual 
Workers in Russian Industry and U.S. Manufacturing, 1980-2000
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Sources: Goskomstat (1999 and 2001a);  U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures, February 2002.
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Non-Manual Workers Share in Total Employment in Russian 
Industry and U.S. Manufacturing, 1980-2000
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Sources:  Goskomstat (2001b);  U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures, February 2002.
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Figure 5:  Possession of Personal Computers per 100 Households
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Source:  Euromonitor (www.euromonitor.com) and the author's calculations.
Notes:  EMU=European Monatery Union;  CEE=Central Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and former Czechoslovakia);  SEE=South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro);  CIS=Commonweatlh of Independent States (all countries of the former Soviet Union 
except for Russia and the Baltic States).  
Figure 6:  Internet Usership per 1,000 Population
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Source:  Euromonitor (www.euromonitor.com) and the author's calculations.
Notes:  EMU=European Monatery Union;  CEE=Central Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and former Czechoslovakia);  SEE=South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro);  CIS=Commonweatlh of Independent States (all countries of the former Soviet Union 
except for Russia and the Baltic States).
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Figure 7:  Skill Wage Premium Decomposition: 
 Supply, Demand, and Institutional Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Distribution of Firms by the Share of Non-Manual Workers, Russian Industry 
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Appendix 1 
High-Technology Industries in the Russian Industrial Classification 
No single methodology for identifying high-technology industries exists.  Most 
calculations rely on a comparison of R&D expenditures or the number of scientists, engineers, 
and technicians with industry value added or output.  For instance, OECD identifies four 
industries as science-based industries whose products involve above-average levels  of R&D:  
aerospace, computers and office machinery, communications equipment, and pharmaceuticals 
(OECD, 1993).  Our classification of high-technology industries for Russia includes all 4- and 5-
digit OKONH industries in which these four products are produced. 
 
Industry  Description  Industry Codes 
Aerospace  Manufacture and services (repair) of aircraft, helicopters, 
their equipment, and engines 
14720 14961 
Computing and 
High Precision 
Equipment 
Manufacture of high precision equipment (14320 14913) 
- Manufacture of high-precision equipment for 
monitoring and regulation of technological processes 
- Manufacture and services of measurement 
equipment 
- Manufacture of optical equipment 
- Office machinery 
- Manufacture of equipment for research in physics, 
medicine, physiology, and biology  
Manufacture and centralized services of computing 
equipment, its parts, software, and other information 
technology (14330 14965)  
14320 (14321-14329) 
14330 (14331-14333) 
14913 14965 
 
Communications 
Equipment 
Manufacture of electronic components, television, radio, 
and other communications equipment 
14750 14760  
14770 (14771 14772) 
Microbiological 
and Medical 
Industry 
Manufacture of medical equipment and microbiological 
products, including pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals, and botanical products 
19100 (19110-19123) 
19300 (19310-19330) 
Other industries to consider as high-technology are manufacture of semi-conductors 
(12313), electrode components (12710), cables (17172), CDs (13145), and defense industry 
(14730).    50 
Appendix 2 
Identification of New Products22 
 
This is the first study that identifies new products for all Russian industries.  “New 
products” are defined as goods produced by Russian industrial firms in 1993-2000 but not 
produced in 1977 according to the 1977 Soviet Classification of Products. Specifically, new 
goods are detected by comparing the 1977 Soviet Classification of Products (1977 OKP) and the 
2000 edition of the 1994 Russian Classification of Products (2000 OKP).  The hard copy of the 
1977 OKP was found in the Library of the State Standardization Committee of the Russian 
Federation (RF Gosstandart) and then it was scanned into an electronic database.  This product 
classification is the oldest existing classification known to be stored in the government archive.  
The latest classification of products (2000 OKP)  was initially introduced in 1994 (with 
subsequent editions).  It is created on the base of the previous Soviet Classification of Products, 
which was revised also in 1985.  The two classifications have a similar general structure and 
employ the same methodology of product classification.  Both OKP classifications represent the 
six-level hierarchical  structure, in which the first level (2-digit OKP) stands for the product 
classes, the second level (3-digit OKP) - the subclasses of products, the third level (4-digit OKP) 
– the product groups, the fourth level (5-digit OKP) - the product subgroups, the fifth level (6-
digit OKP) - the product types, and the sixth level (10-digit OKP) – the technical conditions of 
product manufacturing.23 
The matching process of two classifications began with the merging of two files by their 
6-digit product OKP and comparing the names of products.  The computer program detected 
identical text entries for a significant number of the matched codes.  Computer searches for key 
words identified a few additional matched pairs that represent the same products but have 
different spelling or word order, for instance “Box-calf ore  - Ores for box-calf production”. 
Finally, manual comparison detected extra pairs for the same product but with different 
wording (e.g., “Materials from polyvinyl chloride, in sheets – Sheets from polyvinyl chloride”).  
2,497 of 2,932 product entries from the Registry of Industrial Enterprises are matched by this 
method with certainty. 
This leaves us with the 435 codes from the 2000 OKP that have different name in the 
1977 OKP or do not exist in the old classification.  Because of possible changes in the OKP codes 
between 1977 and 2000 classifications, we had to search the remaining products in the rest of the 
1977 OKP.   This method detected 134 additional matched pairs.  
                                                                 
22 Appendix 2 is prepared jointly with Viktor Orekhov.  An idea of identifying new products by this 
methodology came from Chong Xiang who implemented a similar approach in determining new 
products in U.S. manufacturing (Xiang, 2002). 
23 For example,  91 0000 0000 – products of food industry,  
91 1000 0000 – products of sugar and bread industry,  
91 1100 0000 – sugar 
91 1110 0000 – raw sugar 
91 1111 0000 – raw sugar from beats 
91 1111 0001 – raw sugar from beats produced by the tolling scheme 
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The residual 301 products in the 2000 OKP are checked manually and classified as 
follows: 
•  New (N=106): These entries have no key words or equivalent definitions in the old 1977 
OKP. They also belong to the aggregate groups that are highly sensitive to technological 
changes. In addition, this category includes entries that were added during 1995-2000 
revisions.  Examples include video recorders, video cameras for individual consumers, 
CDs for laser digital recorders, etc. 
•  Possibly new (N=30): These entries have no key words or equivalent definitions in the 
old 1977 OKP.  They typically belong to the aggregate groups and subgroups that exist 
in the 1977 OKP but represent products in addition to the existing product types.  
Examples include air cleaners for individual consumers, home freezers, chewing gums, 
etc. 
•  Old (N=165):  These entries are not matched with the 1977 OKP but they cannot be 
considered as new.  Typically these products have similar (but not the same) names in 
the old 1977 OKP.  Some of them are obviously old products.   52 
Appendix 3 
Measurement Error  in the RPP Data 
 
Even after applying considerable effort toward data cleaning and consistency checks 
(see footnote 12),  one has to pay attention to potential measurement errors in the data.  
Especially long-term longitudinal data from the transition economies are likely to suffer from 
reporting errors caused by numerous changes in statistical forms, classifications, methodology, 
and data collection process.  It is commonly known that fixed effect estimates may aggravate 
inconsistencies due to the measurement error (see Griliches and Hausman, 1984; Baltagi, 1995).  
To  understand the effect of measurement error on our estimates,  we can use additional 
information on the same variable as instrumental variables.  This solution to the measurement 
error problem is sometimes called the multiple indicator solution (see Wooldridge, 2002). 
Suppose that  jt X  is a true unobservable measure of our variable of interest.  Instead of 
the true measure, we observe current year values reported by firm j in current year t( ) t
jt X  and 
current year values reported by firm j in next year t+1( ) 1 + t
jt X .  Without the measurement error, 
the difference between these two measures could be due to either changes in firm boundaries 
( ) 1 + jt B  or changes in reporting methodology( ) 1 + jt M .24   
Thus, we have two error-contained measures of true values of jt X : 
t
jt jt
t
jt X X e + =  and 1
1 1
1 +
+ +
+ + + + = t
jt jt jt jt
t
jt M B X X e , 
where e’s are pure measurement (misreporting) errors.   
Assuming that both measures have uncorrelated error terms, we can use one measure as 
a valid IV for another one to correct for the measurement error. 
( ) 1 , + t
jt
t
jt Corr e e =0 
Unfortunately, such method would lead to a significant reduction of our sample because 
of missing previous year reports and dropping the last year (2000), for which no current year 
reports from next year are available.  As an alternative, at least we can try to determine the 
magnitude and direction of the measurement bias by comparing two sets of estimates for the 
smaller sample. 
First, I note that two measures of output, capital, employment, wage bill, and profit are 
highly correlated.    
( ) 1 , + t
jt
t
jt X X Corr  
    Output  = 0.9042  Total wage bill  = 0.9685 
    Capital    = 0.9518  Profit      = 0.9364 
    Employment  = 0.9898  Profit dummy   = 0.8582 
 
                                                                 
24 According to Goskomstat rules, enterprises have to report the previous year values based on the 
current year firm boundaries and current year reporting methodology.   53 
Table A1 shows the re-estimated equation 9, in which alternative measures of average 
labor productivity, capital/output ratio, and a profit dummy are used as instruments.  Based on 
the Hausman test, we can not reject H 0 that  the differences in coefficients are not systematic.  
The effect of measurement error on the estimated equations does not appear to be statistically 
significant.  Although coefficients are quite close to each other, we observe that some fixed 
effect coefficients tend to be attenuated due to classical error-in-variables.  
 
Table A1:  The Effect of Measurement Error on the Estimated Equations for Relative 
Wages, Russian Industrial Firms, 1992-1999 
Firm Fixed Effect  Firm Fixed Effect with IV  Dependent Variable – 
 Log (Wage ratio)  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Log(employment ratio)  -0.3318a  -97.91  -0.3330a  -97.58 
Capital/output  0.0192a  5.38  0.0237a  4.14 
Capital/output*time  0.0031a  5.34  0.0038a  5.10 
High-tech industries  -0.0110  -0.36  -0.0103  -0.34 
High-tech industries*time  0.0191a  6.26  0.0187a  6.12 
Ever received FDI*time  0.0085a  2.66  0.0083a  2.62 
Labor productivity  -0.0055  -1.34  0.0003  0.04 
Labor productivity*time  0.0007  1.10  0.0010  1.30 
Profit (negative profit is omitted)         
Positive  -0.0276a  -3.46  -0.0482a  -2.34 
Positive*time  0.0050a  3.09  0.0081a  2.35 
Missing or zero  -0.0289a  -1.76  -0.0445a  -2.02 
Missing or zero*time  0.0001  0.02  0.0026  0.59 
Ownership (state is omitted)         
Mixed  -0.0405a  -6.18  -0.0403a  -6.14 
Mixed*time  0.0137a  8.04  0.0135a  7.88 
Private  -0.0363a  -4.66  -0.0366a  -4.71 
Private*time  0.0123a  7.16  0.0123a  7.13 
Intercept  -0.0711a  -1.87  -0.0590  -1.39 
Hausman test – IVFE vs. FE  chi2(30) = 34.45  (Prob>chi2 = 0.2633) 
R2 overall  0.065  0.063 
N  142,973  142,973 
Note:  a significant at 1% level;  b significant at 5% level;  c significant at 10% level.  Year dummies, 9 
industry dummies, and a dummy for 1992 capital/output mismeasurement are included but not shown 
here (see description in the text).  The e stimated equation contains the same set of variables as 
specification 1 in Table 7.  Sample (N) consists of industrial firms with non-missing reports of previous 
year values.  Capital/output ratio, labor productivity, a profit variable, and their interactions with time 
trend are instrumented with alternative measures taken from next year reports of previous year values.     54 
Appendix 4 
Recall Bias in RLMS 
 
The information on occupation and jobs in the pre-transition era (1985 and 1990) is based 
on retrospective data collected in 2000.  Respondents’ answers may suffer, therefore, from recall 
errors (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Evans and Leighton, 1995).  Although stable salaries and 
strong attachment of Russian worker to one job in the Soviet period reduce the recall error, one 
has to consider potential retrospective biases. 
Our approach in analyzing the effect  of the recall error on the estimates is to use the 
multiple indicator solution, as described in Appendix 3.  I exploit the fact that identical 
questions on occupations and jobs in 1985 and 1991 were asked the same respondents two years 
earlier, in 1998. 
Suppose that  ￿
ł
￿ ￿
Ł
￿   it X   is a true unobservable  occupation or job in year t (t=1985 or 
t=1990).  Instead of the true measure, we observe two answers of respondent i in 1998 and 
2000( ) 1998 2000   and   it it X X :   
1985  1990 
2000
1985 , 1985 ,
2000
1985 , i i i r X X + =   2000
1990 , 1990 ,
2000
1990 , i i i r X X + =  
1998
1985 , 1985 ,
1998
1985 , i i i r X X + =   1998
1990 , 91 1990 , 1990 ,
1998
1990 , i i i i r J X X + D + = -  
where r’s are recall errors.   
  For 1985, the difference between these two measures is the difference between two recall 
errors.  For 1990, the difference could be also due to real changes in jobs and occupations 
between 1990 and 1991( ) 91 1990 , - D i J . 
Table A2 shows a relatively high percentage of identical answers given by respondents 
during two different surveys on occupation and job in the pre-transition period.  Table A2 does 
not reveal any discrepancies between occupational measures at the 1-digit level that I use in 
classifying manual and non-manual employees.  Thus, occupational variables are unlikely to 
cause retrospective biases in the estimates.  However, biased estimates might arise from 
inconsistent answers concerning the name of the employer.  This could lead not only to 
different firm characteristics but also to a different sample of firms in the linked employer-
employee data. 
To determine the effect of recall error on the augmented wage functions and returns to a 
skilled job, one solution is to estimate alternative specifications with the set of firms and firm 
characteristics taken from the 1998 survey and  then to apply  the Hausman test to  see how 
significant the differences in coefficients are. 
Table A3 reports alternative estimates of augmented wage functions that use two job 
measures from 1998 and 2000 surveys.  Based on the Hausman test, we can not reject H 0 that the 
differences in coefficients are not systematic in four of five specifications.  Only the last 
specification shows statistically significant differences in coefficients.  Because the coefficients in 
the last specification have the same sign and they are close in their magnitude, these differences   55 
will not effect interpretation of our results.  Thus, the effect of recall error on the estimated 
equations does not appear to be significant.   
 
Table A2:  Percent of Identical Answers on Occupation, Industry, and Firm Name 
  All Sample  Linked Employer-Employee 
Sample 
  1985  1990-1991  1985  1990-1991 
Occupation  4-digit   72.3  69.9  70.6  67.4 
    3-digit  74.7  72.6  73.4  70.4 
    2-digit  78.3  76.9  77.0  75.4 
    1-digit  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
N  [3666]  [3644]  [996]  [1004] 
Industry  4-digit   87.8  87.1  88.5  86.7 
    3-digit  88.2  87.6  88.6  87.0 
    2-digit  89.1  88.9  89.8  88.5 
    1-digit  91.0  91.3  92.4  91.7 
N  [3562]  [3557]  [992]  [1001] 
Identification of firm  89.1  88.8  88.2  86.0 
N  [2220]  [2247]  [994]  [1005]   56 
Table A3:  The Effect of Recall Error on Augmented Wage Functions and Returns to a 
Skilled Job in the Linked Employer-Employee Data  
(Individual Fixed Effects, Russian Industry, 1985-2000) 
  Primary Job Measures  
(2000 Survey) 
Alternative Job Measures 
(1998 Survey) 
  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Specification 1:         
Schooling (years)  0.002  0.04  0.004  0.08 
Schooling*time  0.003a  2.92  0.003a  3.37 
Experience (years)  0.043  0.81  0.053  1.00 
Experience squared / 100  -0.029a  -2.65  -0.032a  -2.92 
Employee has shares  0.058b  2.24  0.058b  2.24 
No information on employee shares  -0.004  -0.11  -0.004  -0.11 
High-tech industries  0.025  0.20  0.066  0.52 
High-tech industries*time  -0.015  -1.54  -0.016c  -1.66 
High-tech industries*SKL  -0.192  -1.18  -0.292c  -1.77 
High-tech industries*SKL*time  0.007  0.50  0.012  0.87 
Profit zero or missing  0.170a  4.27  0.189a  4.79 
Profit positive  0.137b  2.05  0.143b  2.13 
Profit positive*time  -0.008  -1.47  -0.008  -1.57 
Profit positive*SKL  -0.230a  -3.03  -0.158b  -2.12 
Profit positive*SKL*time  0.018a  2.97  0.013b  2.08 
Intercept  8.595  6.58  8.495a  6.49 
N  7729  7682 
R2 within/ R2 overall  0.095/0.162  0.095/0.144 
  Hausman Test  P-value 
Specification 1  Chi2 (29) = 10.09  0.9996 
Specification 2  Chi2 (26) = 29.48  0.2898 
Specification 3  Chi2 (34) = 21.22  0.9572 
Specification 4  Chi2 (30) = 30.11  0.4600 
Specification 5  Chi2 (24) = 47.81  0.0027 
Notes:  a significant at 1% level;  b significant at 5% level;  c significant at 10% level.  SKL= non-manual 
workers including managers, professionals, associate professionals, clerks, service workers, and army 
specialists.  Year dummies and 9 industry dummies are included but not shown here.  All specifications 
contain the same set of variables as in Table 8.   The sample (N) consists of respondents participated in 
both surveys.  
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